Case List

Anonymous Tips

Blood Test Cases

Chain of Custody v. Confrontation

Knoll Cases

Knoll - Misc

Miscellaneous Cases

Miscellaneous PDFs

Probable Case Cases

Reasonable Suspicion - Alpha

Reasonable Suspicion - Misc

Roadblock Cases

Roadblock - Misc

Search & Seizure Cases

Search & Seizure - Misc

Wreck Cases

Wrecks - Misc


Reasonable Suspicion - Alphabetized by 1st defendant’s last name:

  1. State v Adkins & Eanes, 90 N.C.App. 333 (1988)  Weaving and run off road 1 time = Reasonable Suspicion.
  2. U.S. v Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002) - Bad case - Legal behavior can lead to  Reasonable Suspicion.
  3. State v Aubin, 100 N.C.App. 628 (1990) - Bad case - Slow driving and weaving=Reasonable Suspicion (pre-Wrenn)
  4. State v Barnard, 62 N.C. 244, 65 (2008) - Bad case - 30 second delay at green light = Reasonable Suspicion. (But see State v. Roberson)
  5. State v Battle, 109 N.C.App. 367 (1993) - Reasonable Suspicion defined.
  6. State v Bonds, 139 N.C.App. 627 (2000) - Bad case - Reasonable Suspicion = equals combo of all factors (here, window down in cold weather).
  7. State v Braxton, 90 N.C.App. 204 (1988) - Furtive movement does not lead to Reasonable Suspicion.  No authority to arrest for infraction.
  8. Brendlin v CA 551 U.S.  249, 127 S.Ct. 2400 (2007)-R.S. Passenger can challenge stop.
  9. U.S. v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) - Reasonable Suspicion defined: Mexican not enough.
  10. State v Burke, __ N.C.App. ___, 712 S.E.2d 704 (2011) - Affirmed by NC Supreme Court on January 27, 2012. Low number on 30-day tag does NOT = Reasonable Suspicion.  Can’t guess on Reasonable Suspicion. The officer stopped the vehicle because the numbers on the 30-day tag looked low and that the "low" number led him to "wonder[sic] about the possibility of the tag being fictitious." The court noted that it has previously held that 30-day tags that were unreadable, concealed, obstructed, or illegible, justified stops of the vehicles involved. Here, although the officer testified that the 30-day tag was dirty and worn, he was able to read the tag without difficulty; the tag was not faded; the information was clearly visible; and the information was accurate and proper.
  11. Illinois v Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)  - Fisher/Falana; dissent good. How long can you be held after a stop?
  12. State v Campbell, 188 N.C.App. 701 (2008) Mere proximity to crime not enough But here there was more and thus enough for Reasonable Suspicion.
  13. State v Chlopek, 704 S.E.2d. 563 (2011) - Suspicious not enough.
  14. Webb v Clark, 264 N.C. 474 (1965) - Spinning tires not equal to careless and reckless.
  15. State v Clyburn, 120 N.C.App. 377 (1995) - Search of auto for carrying concealed weapon, Reasonable Suspicion rules. (pre-Gant).
  16. State v Coleman, 743 S.E.2d 62 (2013) Open container in PVA not R.S.
  17. State v Cooper, 186 N.C.App. 100 (2007) - Report that black male committed armed robbery without more did not provide police officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify stop and frisk.
  18.  State v Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456 - Simple violation of a traffic regulation which does not involve actual danger to life, limb or property would not perforce constitute the criminal offense reckless driving.
  19. State v Covington, 138 N.C.App. 688 (2000)  - Reasonable Suspicion defined.
  20. State v Davis,  165 N.C. App. 545 (2004) Unpublished - Weaving within 1 lane for more than .5 mile, then crossing the center line, + 10 miles below speed limit enough for Reasonable Suspicion.
  21. State v Derbyshire, 745 S.E.2d 886 (2013) One weave + bright lights not equal to R.S.
  22. FL v Diaz, 800 So.2d 326 (2001)  - Stop based on mistake not ok.
  23. US v Doyle, 650 F.3d 460 (2011) - Evidence excluded based on search warrant defective as to time (staleness)
  24. State v Falana, 129 N.C.App. 813 (1998) - Once original purpose of stop is done, need additional Reasonable Suspicion to continue.
  25. State v Fields, 673 S.E.2d 765 (2009) - Weaving is not enough for Reasonable Suspicion.
  26. State v Fisher, 141 N.C.App. 44 (2000)  - After traffic stop, need Reasonable Suspicion for further detention.
  27. State v Fleming, 106 N.C.App. 165 (1992) Follows Brown v. Texas. Not a car case.
  28. State v Foster, NO. 09-5161 (2010) - NO Reasonable Suspicion.
  29. US v Fountain Foster, 2011 WL 857785 (2011) - NO Reasonable Suspicion. Panel deeply troubled by Government’s attempts to spin defendant’s “largely mundane acts into a web of deceptions".
  30. State v Griffin 589 F.3d 148 (2009)-RS to stop.
  31.  State v Haislip 651 S.E.2d 243 (2007)-When is a checkpoint stop a checkpoint stop?  Also-what is a stop?
  32. State v Hayes, 88 N.C.App. 313 (2008)  - Follows Fleming, this is a car case.
  33. State v Heien, 714 S.E.2d 827 (2011) - One brake light is enough. Write of supersedes and review allowed to NC Supreme Court, 1/26/12.
  34. State v Hernandez, 170 N.C.App. 299 (2005) - Held after stop is ok, but must be short (under 10 minutes). Also, here there was consent to search.
  35. State v Hess, 185 N.C.App. 530 (2007) - Driver revoked = Reasonable Suspicion.
  36. State v Hiatt, 184 N.C.App. 190 (2007) - Blue lights= stop. Unpublished
  37. State v Hodges, 672 S.E.2d 724 (2009)  - Interprets Falana. Held yes to Reasonable Suspicion here.
  38. State v Hopper, NO. COA09-1211 - Reasonable Suspicion mistake of fact ok mistake of law not ok. Unpublished
  39. State v Huey, 694 S.E.2d 410 (2010) - Officer must be sure client resembles criminal.
  40. State v Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 (2006) - No turn signal is not Reasonable Suspicion to stop. (But see St. v. Styles)
  41. State v Jacobs, 162 N.C.App. 251 (2004) - Reasonable Suspicion where officer observed defendant's car weaving within its lane of travel for three-quarters of a mile at 1:43 a.m. in an area near bars.
  42. State v Johnson, 204 N.C.App. 259, 264, 693 S.E.2d 711, 714-715 (2010) “Defendant contends that the trial court committed error by upholding the warrantless stop of his car based solely on the information provided to the police by an anonymous tipster. We conclude that, while the tip at issue included identifying details of a person and car allegedly engaged in illegal activity, it offered few details of the alleged crime, no information regarding the informant's basis of knowledge, and scant information to predict the future behavior of the alleged perpetrator. Thus, given the limited details contained in the tip, and the failure of the officers to corroborate the tip's allegations of illegal activity, the tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the warrantless stop in this case.
  43. State v Jones, 96 N.C.App. 389 (1989) Weaving and slow driving = Reasonable Suspicion.
  44. State v Jones, No. 11-4268 - Blocking car=need Reasonable Suspicion (=STOP!)
  45. State v Knudsen NO.COA12-1475-Open container in PVA not RS.
  46. State v Kochuk 741 S.E.2d 327 (2012)-Fail to maintain lane control not RS.
  47. Rowe v Maryland, 363 Md. 424, 769 A.2d 879 (2001) Driver's momentary crossing of edge line of roadway and later touching of that line did not amount to unsafe lane change or unsafe entry onto the roadway, conduct prohibited by statute, and did not support traffic stop. Driver's momentary crossing of edge line of roadway and later touching of that line did not rise to level necessary to justify traffic stop on the ground that it was community caretaking stop for purposes of providing assistance.
  48. State v Malunda 749 S.E.2d 280 (2013)-PC to search vehicle not equal to PC to search passenger.
  49. US v Mayo, 361 F.3d 802 (2004) - An encounter occurring in a high-crime area that was targeted for special enforcement by police does not support reasonable suspicion unless coupled with other suspicious activity.
  50. State v McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 517 (1999) - Reasonable Suspicion = nervous and problems with car ownership.
  51. State v McLamb, 186 N.C.App. 124 (2007) Cop’s mistake as to speed limit gives no Probable Cause to stop.
  52. State v McRae, NO.COA09-114 - No turn signal can be Reasonable Suspicion. Reliable informant tip can supply Probable Cause or Reasonable Suspicion.
  53. Kansas v Morris, 276 Kan. 11 (2003) - Blue lights and stop are equal to a seizure, and so need Reasonable Suspicion.
  54. State v Murray, 192 N.C.App. 684 (2008) - Police officer lacked Reasonable Suspicion when he stopped a vehicle to find out why it was traveling in an area with a history of break-ins.
  55. State v Myles, 654 S.E.2d 752 (2008) Passenger’s nervousness not enough for Reasonable Suspicion - Falana
  56. State v Otto, 726 S.E.2d 752 (2012) - Weaving + Reasonable Suspicion = Bad case.
  57. State v Phifer 741 S.E.2d 446 (2013)-Nervous behaviour alone does not equal RS.
  58. State v Rhyne, 124 N.C.App. 84 (1996) - Pat down not ok.
  59. State v Roberson, 240 N.C. 745 (1954) - Skidding + wreck equals C&R.
  60. State v Roberson, 592 S.E.2d 733 (2004) - 6 second delay at green light is not Reasonable Suspicion.
  61. State v Schiffer, 132 N.C.App. 22 (1999) - Windshield tinting enough for Reasonable Suspicion. Car search o.k. (Pre-Gant).
  62. State v Sellars, NO.COA11-1315 (2012) - Falana. Not good-look at how long stop extended.
  63. State v Smathers 753 S.E.2d 380 (2014)-No PC for traffic stop needed, with community caretaking doctrine adopted for first time by NC Court of Appeals.
    A. In this case any alleged community care taking exception is a pretext for impermissible
    criminal investigation.
    B. In this case, a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred
    and under the totality of the circumstances an objectively reasonable basis for a community
    care taking function is not shown. But if shown, the public need or interest does not outweigh the intrusion upon the privacy of the individual.
    C. In considering the applicability of the community care taking exception, courts must consider the degree of the public interest and the exigency of the situation; (2) the attendant circumstances surrounding the seizure, including time, location, the degree of overt authority and force displayed; (3) whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the availability, feasibility, and effectiveness of alternatives to the type of intrusion actually accomplished, where danger to life and limb may not be imminent, but could be prevented by swift action.
  64. State v Styles, 362 N.C. 412 (2008) - No turn signal when changing lanes can be enough to stop.
  65. Terry v Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. (1968)-Probable cause defined.
  66. State of Texas v Tarvin, 972 S.W.2d 910 (1998) - Weaving not enough, driving =Controlled weaving.
  67. State v Thompson & Hardee, 296 N.C.703 (1979) - Reasonable Suspicion defined, bad case.
  68. State v Verkerk 747 S.E.2d 658 (2013)-Stop by fireman ok here.
  69. State v Warren  NO. COA02-1693- No blue lights = no stop. Unpublished
  70. State v Watson, 122 N.C.App. 596 (1996) - Reasonable Suspicion defined.
  71. State v Weaver 752 S.E.2d 240 (2013)-Private security guard does not need RS.
  72. US v Whren and Brown, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) - Any objective reason is enough for Reasonable Suspicion.
  73. U.S. v Wilson, 205 F.3d 720 (2000) - Can’t see the tag not enough for Reasonable Suspicion.
  74. State v Young, 148 N.C.App. 462 (2002) - Reasonable Suspicion is an objective inquiry; anonymous tip enough here.

Reasonable Suspicion - Miscellaneous

  1. SFST Analysis Form
  2. Traffic Stops-Article from IOG
  3. Analysis of legality of running tags without Reasonable Suspicion.
  4. “Passing and being passed “ from Motor Vehicle Law of North Carolina (not illegal to pass on a double yellow line).
  5. List of speed and weaving cases.

Anonymous Tips

  1. State v Allen, 676 S.E.2d 519 (2009) - In person tip more reliable. Good law discussion for the State.
  2. State v Brown, 142 N.C.App. 332 (2001) - Anonymous tip not enough-follows Florida v. J.L.
  3. State v Coleman, NO.COA12-1173 (2012)  - Not enough here to stop.
  4. State v Cooper, 186 N.C.App. 100 (2007)  - Anonymous tip not enough to stop.
  5. State v Crowell, NO.COA09-635 Unpublished - Not anonymous tip proven if tipster reliable.
  6. State v Garcia, 677 S.E.2d 555 (2009)  - A less than reliable anonymous tip may still provide a basis for reasonable suspicion if supported by sufficient police corroboration.
  7. Harris v Commonwealth of VA, 262 Va. 407 (2001) - Anonymous tip not enough
  8. State v Harwood, NO. COA11-1513 - Anonymous Tip not ok. Seizure when defendant blocked in by officers (+more)
  9. State v Hudgins, 672 S.E.2d 717 (2009)  - Anonymous tip, bad case.
  10. State v Hughes, 353 N.C. 200 (2000)  - Anonymous tip, good case.
  11. U.S. v Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013 (2008)  - Anonymous tip not enough to pat down.
  12. FL v J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000)  - Anonymous tip rules.
  13. State v Maready, 362 N.C. 614 (2008)  - Anonymous tip, bad case.
  14. State v McArn, 159 N.C.App. 209 (2003)  - Need details of crime, not just behavior, to get to Reasonable Suspicion.
  15. State v Morton, 346 S.E.2d 437 (2009) - Good case. Anonymous tip reliability.
  16. State v Peele, 675 S.E.2d 682 (2009)  - Anonymous tip and weaving not Reasonable Suspicion.
  17. U.S. v Reaves, 512 F.3d 123 (2008)  - Anonymous tip alone not enough.
  18. State v Robinson, 148 N.C.App. 462 (2002)  - Anonymous tip not enough, but search ok.
  19. State v Sanchez, 147 N.C.App. 619 (2001) - Face-to-face informant tip reliable.
  20. State v Young, 148 N.C.App. 462 (2002) - Reasonable Suspicion is objective, anonymous tip ok here.

Roadblock Cases

  1. State v Barnes, 123 N.C.App. 144 (1996) - No discretion allowed at checkpoint.
  2. State v Bowden, 177 N.C.App. 718 (2006) -  A turn away from a checkpoint roadblock can lead to RS.
  3. State v Burroughs, 185 N.C.App. 496 (2007) - Upholds Rose and Edmond.
  4. State v Colbert, 146 N.C.App. 506 (2001) - Roadblock plan ok.
  5. State v Collins, NO. COA11-529 - Turn away from checkpoint/not a checkpoint stop. Need RS.
  6. State v Corpening, 683 S.E.2d 457 (2009) - Not a checkpoint stop.
  7. Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)  - Roadblock to serve general interest in crime control violates 4th amendment.
  8. State v Foreman, 351 N.C. 627 (2000)  - Okay to stop for u-turn at roadblock if RS. (Here there was R.S.; no roadblock analysis necessary).
  9. State v Gabriel, 192 N.C.App/ 517 (2008)  - Checkpoint rules.
  10. State v Griffin 734 S.E.2d 861 (2013) - Three point turn begins ->RS
  11. State v Grooms, 126 N.C.App. 88 (1997)  - Every driver must be treated the same.
  12. State v Haislip, NO.COA06-1488 (2007) - Client cannot be arrested if pre-arrest test is requested.
  13. State v Jarrett, NO.COA09-1036 (2010) - Roadblock. Bad Ruling.
  14. State v Kincer, NO.COA09-1639 - Checkpoint-good on explaining the rules.
  15. IL v Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) - Roadblock to get information on hit and run ok.
  16. State v Mitchell, 358 N.C. 63 (2004)  - Defendant’s not stopping for checkpoint or his “headlong flight” supplied RS. Roadblock ok for NOL.
  17. State v Nolan, NO.COA10-518 - Roadblock case-this case ok.
  18. Delaware v Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) - USSC says roadblocks are ok sometimes.
  19. State v Rose, 170 N.C.App. 284 (2005)  - Roadblock needs primary purpose. Multi-purpose checkpoint is illegal. Must be carefully tailored to purpose.
  20. State v Sanders, 112 N.C.App. 477 (1993)  - No unconstrained discretion allowed.
  21. Michigan v Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)  - Roadblock rules, citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648 (1979).
  22. US v Smith, 396 F.3d 579 (2005) - Defendant’s evasive behavior regarding roadblock supports finding of reasonable suspicion for stop.
  23. State v Tarlton, 146 N.C.App. 417 (2001)  - Roadblock-supervisor not necessary, written not necessary.
  24. State v Veazey, 689 S.E.2d 530 (2009)  - Bad checkpoint case. Ruling mostly based on poor appellate advocacy and trail work.
  25. State v Veazey, 191 N.C.App. 181 (2008) - Updates Rose. Still need primary purpose and 3 factor ground analysis.
  26. STATE v. McDONALD, NO.COA14-893 (2015) - Roadblock still need Brown analysis (affirms Veazey.)

Roadblock - Miscellaneous

  1. Order in Robinson Checkpoint not okay.

Search & Seizure
  1. State v Alston, 131 N.C.App. 514 (1998)  -  Constructive possession of gun not imputed to passenger.
  2. State v Artis, 472 S.E.2d 169 (1996)  - Pat down search not okay. (Pants pocket bulge).
  3. US v Bond, 529 U.S. 334 (2000)  - Police squeezing bag in overhead bin in bus not ok. Plain feel not enough!
  4. State v Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)  - Bus search rules, consent to search.
  5. State v Braxton, 90 N.C.App. 204 (1988)  - Need Probably Cause to search
  6. Caldwell v State, 780 A.2d 1037 (2001)  - The officer’s citing a defendant with a parking violation does not then permit the officer to frisk and handcuff the defendant and detain him until another officer arrives.
  7. State v Carter, 682 S.E.2d (2009)  - Search and seizure of car incident to arrest for expired tag is lawful.
  8. State v Carty, 170 N.J. 632 (2002)  - After traffic stop need Reasonable Suspicion to search car. (NJ constitution stricter than US Constitution, as is NC Constitution).
  9. State v Cooke, 306 N.C. 132 (1982)  - Explains exceptions to warrant requirement.
  10. State v Fleming, 106 N.C.App. 165 (1992)  - Pat down after arrest requires probable cause.
  11. AZ v Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009)  - No search of car after charge unless related to charge or defendant in car when arrested.
  12. State v Hedgecoe, Jr., 106 N.C.App. 157 (1992)  - Paraphernalia must be connected to drugs.
  13. Co v Heilman, 52 P.3d 324 (2002) S - earch not consensual because officer’s asked.
  14. WY v Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)  - Refines consent to search.
  15. State v Icard, 363 N.C. 303 (2009) - Probably Cause is needed to detain defendant.
  16. State v Jackson, 681 S.E.2d 492 (2009)  - Passenger has standing to contest unconstitutional stop.
  17. State v Mbacke, 721 S.E.2d 218 (2012) - Bad case re: Gant search.
  18. Jones v U.S., 362 U.S. 257 (1960)  - Needs reasonable corroboration of informant’s statement for Probably Cause.
  19. Knowles v Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)  - Search after traffic citation, even if consent, not ok.
  20. US v Lattimore, 87 F.3d. 647 (1996) - Consent to search after traffic stop.
  21. US v Maple, 348 F.3d 260 (2003)  - Search of car’s closed compartment must be reasonable and must follow police procedure.
  22. State v McDougald, 665 S.E.2d 99 (2008)  - Search with consent from one resident with another non-consenting resident present is not ok in private areas.
  23. Mincey v Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) E  - mergency exception to 4th Amendment warrant requirement.
  24. State v Minor, 132 N.C.App. 478 (1999) S  - earch of car when the defendant gets out of a car is not okay without more information. (movement not “furtive.”)
  25. State v Nance, 149 N.C.App. 734 (2002)  - Must be legally in area for plain view.
  26. State v Pasour, NO.COA12-190 (2012)  - Cops must legally be there to get plain view.
  27. State v Pearson, 348 N.C. 272 (1998) - Consent to search vehicle does not include a pat down, pat down “protective” search not okay.
  28. State v Poczontek, 90 N.C.App. 455 (1988) - Probably Cause - Informant, plain view? Good case.
  29. Ga v Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) - Search case- 1 resident says yes, one says no, no consent, no search.
  30. Commonwealth of VA v Rice, 28 Va. App. 374 (1998) - If cop holds Driver's License, defendant not free to leave and therefore his consent is invalid.
  31. Oh v Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) - When is consent to illegal search freely given?
  32. US v Antoine Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) - GPS track requires warrant.
  33. US v Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164 (1998)  - Legal to frisk passenger if Reasonable Suspicion exists.
  34. U.S. v Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) - Defendant can only claim 4th amendment violation if defendant’s rights have been violated.
  35. State v Simmons, NO.COA09-268 (2010) - Cigar guts not equal to drugs.
  36. IL v Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) - High crime area + unprovoked flight = Reasonable Suspicion to frisk. (Terry case.)
  37. Yarborough v Alvarado, 124 S.ct. 2140 (2004)  - Miranda - Did defendant feel free to leave?
  38. State v Williams, 673 S.E.2d 394 (2009) - Plain feel standard as Probably Cause.

Knoll Cases

  1. State v Burns, NO.COA08-1181 Unpublished. - State must provide a phone calls all #’s or breath test supervised.
  2. State v Eliason, 100 N.C. App. 313, 395 S.E.2d 702 (1990) - Good explanation of the three cases considered in State v. Knoll; in this case it was found that defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated.
  3. State v Elson, No. COA98-125, affirmed by 130 N.C.App. 760 (1998) - State’s burden to prove no violation if refusal or no chemical test.
  4. State v Ferguson, 90 N.C. App. 513, 369 S.E.2d 378 (1998) - Case should be dismissed when a defendant is denied access to a potential witness after the witness arrived in a timely fashion and made a reasonable effort to gain access to the defendant.
  5. State v Gilbert, 85 N.C. App. 594; 355 S.E.2d 261 (1987) - Need to show prejudice if the breath tests result is .08 or above to get relief.
  6. State v Haas, 131 N.C. App. 113, 505 S.E.2d 311(1998) - Defendant needs to show prejudice. Bad case.
  7. State v Ham, 105 N.C. App. 658, 414 S.E.2d 577 (1992) - Defendant needs to show prejudice. Here a one hour delay was not prejudicial.
  8. State v Hatley, 661 S.E.2d 43 (2008) - Knoll violated; but defendant also must show prejudice.
  9. State v Hayes, 188 N.C. App. 313 (2008) - Knoll violated, defendant must also show prejudice.
  10. State v Hill, 277 N.C. App. 547 (1971) - Refusal of the jailer to permit the defendant’s attorney to see him is inherently prejudicial. (Knoll is based on this case.)
  11. State v Labinski, 654 S.E.2d 740 (2008) - Defendant must show prejudice in order to be successful in arguing a Knoll violation.
  12. State v. Myers, 118 N.C. App. 452, 455 S.E.2d 492 (1995) - The defendant unequivocally asked that his wife be permitted to observe the taking of the breathalyzer test. Officer made a statement that “that might not be a good idea.” Officer had no right to refuse that request and so charges must be dismissed.
  13. State v. Knoll, 322 N.C. App. 535 (1988) - Delay in releasing a defendant from custody after being charged with DWI can cause irrevocable prejudice, justifying dismissal of case.

Knoll - Miscellaneous

  1. State v. Rao (Memorandum of Law by Marcus on Knoll)
  2. State v. Tuckett (Memo of Law) When cops deny witness’ access to FSTs, they violate Knoll.
  3. Memorandum of law #2 on Knoll by Marcus.

Miscellaneous Cases

  1. State v. Absher, Unpublished. - Destruction of Video Evidence.
  2. State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425 (2005) - Adopts Blakely and Apprendi. Jury decides punishment beyond reasonable doubt.
  3. State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981) - Constructive possession of gun not imputed to passenger.
  4. State v. Apprendi, 731 A. 2d 485 (1999) - Aggravating factors must be proven to jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
  5. State v. Barron, NO. COA09-770 - Constructive possession. Not enough to just be in the room.
  6. State v. Bartlett, 130 N.C. App. 79 (1998) - Alka-sensor not admissible- if not sure controlled substance, can't seize.
  7. WA v. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) - Apprendi adopted.
  8. State v. Blocker  -  Boykin allowed
  9. Boykin v. AL, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed (1969) - AF’s.
  10. State v. Bordeaux, NO. COA09-1484 - Confession involuntarily even after Miranda.
  11. Brady v. MD, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963) - DA must disclose all potentially exculpatory info.
  12. State v. Brennan, NO. COA09-1362 - Melendez-Diaz one expert can’t test another’s opinion.
  13. State v. Buchanan, 355 N.C. 264, 559 S.E.2d 785(2002) See also State v. Buchanan 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001). - The test for arrest is whether reasonable person in defendant's place would have believed in custody, not officers subjective intent.
  14. State v. Buckner, 34 N.C. App. 447, 238 S.E.2d 635(1977) - 30 minute wait required if defendant exercises right to witness.
  15. State v. Burrow NO.COA11-773 M-D, -  Officer can’t testify re-pills, need lab analyst.
  16. Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. __ (Jan. 10, 2011) - Great Brady case. Specifically, "Boatner’s testimony was the only evidence linking Smith to the crime. Also, Boatner’s undisclosed statements directly contradicted his testimony. Boatner’s undisclosed statements, the Court concluded, were plainly material."
  17. State v. Cao, 175 N.C. App. 434, 626 S.E.2d 301 (2006) - Crawford-records ok if only objective facts, no opinions. (Before Melendez-Diaz)
  18. State v. Carrouthers, NO. COA-1470 - Handcuffs are not necessarily custody. Bad case!
  19. State v. Catoe, 78 N.C. App. 167, 336 S.E.2d 691(1985) E  - xtrapolation evidence ok sometimes.
  20. State v. Clark, 12 Ired. 151, 1851 WL 1154 N.C. (1851) - Expert witness.
  21. State v. Coffey, 658 S.E.2d 73 (2008) - Indef. extension of revocation for no 508 is GAF.
  22. State v. Cooke, 270 N.C. 644, 155 S.E.2d 165 (1967) - Blood test case-drunk at time of accident is all that is relevant.
  23. State v. Cothran, 463 S.E.2d 423(1995) - Bad case; .08 is enough.
  24. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354,158 L.Ed. 177 (2004) - Defendant has the right to confront witnesses against him (Melendez-Diaz based on this case).
  25. State v. Cruz, 173 N.C.App. 689 (2005) - Melendez-Diaz @ Sentencing.
  26. D&W Inc v City of Charlotte, 152 SE 2d 199 (1966) - D/C & S/C must follow NC Ct App & NCSC cases even if stayed;
  27. WA v. Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) - Definition of testimonial: statements made to cops where primary purpose is to meet emergency needs are not testimonial (here 911 call).
  28. State v. Davis, 142 N.C. App. 81, 542 S.E.2d 236(2001) - Refusal and blood test admissible.
  29. State v. Delaney, 613 S.E.2d 699 (2005) - Expert may use info from other experts to opine.
  30. State v. Fletcher, 688 S.E.2d 94 (2010) - Blood draw w/out warrant ok if exigent circumstances. Bad case.
  31. State v. Ford, 164 N.C.App. 566 (2004) - PBT not admissible unless statue specifically allows.
  32. State v. Fortney, 687 SE 2d 518 (2010) - Record points for out of state law-process.
  33. State v. Fowler, 676 S.E.2d 523 (2009) 2006 - DWI statue/procedure reviewed and okayed. (Sorry Bill!)
  34. State v. Friend, No. COA11-572 ST VD - Re-charge is okay.
  35. ND v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454 (2008) - Community caretaking exception not applicable in a dwelling.
  36. State v. Hairr, 244 N.C. 506 (1956) I  - nsufficient for a 20-138 conviction for the court to show that a def drove an auto on a highway within the state when he has drunk a sufficient quantity of intoxicating liquor to affect however slightly his mental or physical faculties. Must show loss of normal control and appreciable impairment.
  37. State v. Hanton, 623 SE 2d 600 (2006) - What is similar off to NC offense?
  38. State of Florida v. Harris, - Dog Sniff is not necessarily pc.
  39. State v. Hatley, 661 S.E.2d 43 (2008) - Witness arrives on time and not allowed to be witness-not to suppress intox result allowed.
  40. State v. Hearst, 356 NC 312, (2001) - Inpatient credit for Habitual DWI?.
  41. State v. Hensley, 190 N.C. App. 600 (2008) - Possession of alcohol-need evidence of what was in the bottle.
  42. U.S. v. Herring, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009) - Exclusion not always warranted by evidence mix up.
  43. State v. Hewitt, 263 N.C. 759 (1965) - But: no evidence of impairment after 4 beers and 1 whiskey.
  44. OH v. Homan, 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 (2000) - FST's require strict compliance.
  45. Howerton v. Helmet, LTD, 581 S.E.2d 816 (2003) S  - tandards for experts-not Daubert!
  46. State v. Hudgins, 606 S.E.2d 443(2005) - Necessity defense.
  47. State v. Jenkins, 527 S.E.2d 672 (2000) - DV-pretrial release case.
  48. State v. Joe, 711 S.E.2d 842 (2011) - No RDO by running if consensual encounter.
  49. U.S. v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137 (2005) - Community caretaking exception to warrant requirement.
  50. U.S. v. King, 628 F.3d 693 (2011) - Brady violation-if evidence could be exculpatory, must be disclosed.
  51. State v. Lawson, 285 N.C. 320, 204 S.E.2d 843(1974) - Miranda upheld: statement excluded.
  52. Lee v. Gore, NO. COA09-370-2  - Refusal must be willful and affidavit must be correct to support suspension. Affirmed by Supremes.
  53. State v. Lewis, 603 S.E.2d 559 (2004) - Crawford case
  54. State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C. App. 370, 235 S.E.2d 281(1977) - 30 min wait not necessary unless defendant exercises rights to witness.
  55. State v. Madry, 140 NC App 600 (2000) - Warrant must allege all facts necessary.
  56. State v. Matias, 556 S.E.2d 269 (2001) - Constructive possession (diff. from Weems.)
  57. MA v. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009) - Right to confrontation extends to lab techs.
  58. State v. McBride, 109 NCApp 64 (1993) - When can court use other charge as agg. factor.
  59. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US 419 (1995) - Brady Revised.
  60. State v. McKown, 236 Ill.2d 278 (2010) - HGN unless some alcohol not an amount.
  61. State v. Messick, NO. COA090-940
  62. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ____ (2013) - No blood without warrant.
  63. State v. Moore, 513 S.E.2d 346 (1999) - Positive test for drugs not equal to impaired.
  64. State v. Morgan, 362 N.C. 686 (2008) - DWI pre-2006 amendments-State's appeal  rights limited.
  65. Atkins v. Moye, 277 N.C. 179 (1970) - Odor (of alcohol) standing alone is no evidence that he is under influence of an intoxicant and the mere fact that he has had a drink will not support such a finding.
  66. State v. Myers, 118 N.C. App. 452, 455 S.E.2d 492(1995) - When defendant requests witness, state must allow.
  67. State v. Nabors, No.COA10-176 (2010) - Cop ID of drugs not enough to prove.
  68. State v. Narron, 666 S.E.2d 860 (2008) - Per se rule .08 not an irrebutable presumption.
  69. State v. Oates, __ N.C. App. __, __ S.E.2d __ (June 21, 2011) (Link). - The State failed to give proper notice of appeal from the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. The State filed written notice of appeal after the trial judge granted the defendant’s motion in open court but before the trial court entered the written order. Although judgment occurs when the sentence is pronounced, entry of an order occurs when it is reduced to writing, signed by the trial court, and filed with the clerk. The State failed to file written notice of appeal within 14 days after entry of the court’s order.
  70. State v. Palmer, 676 S.E.2d 559 (2009) - Post 2006 procedure in State's appeal of DWI pretrial motions.
  71. State v. Powell, 666 F.3d 180 - Not a car case. NO Reasonable Suspicion for patdown.
  72. State v. Perry, NO. COA03-1419 - Search warrant does not allow search of all people present.
  73. State v. Rivens, 679 S.E.2d 145 (2009) - LEO's have right to approach residence and ask questions.
  74. Robinson v. Seaboard System Railroad, Inc., 87 N.C. App. 512, 361 S.E.2d 909(1987) - Expert witness needs some knowledge. (See Howerton)
  75. State v. Rogers, 124 N.C. App. 364 (1996) - Alka-sensor procedure-anything ok. Bad case.
  76. State v. Shockley, NO. COA09-241 - Insufficient sample does not impede consecutive tests.
  77. State v. Shuping, 213 N.C. 421, 323 S.E.2d 350 (1984) - .10 is enough.
  78. State v. Smith, 262 N.C. 472, 137 S.E.2d 819 (1964) - In RDO, warrant must allege the cops duty and what defendant did to resist.
  79. State v. Mulder, COA13-672 Aggravating factors used can't also be convictions.
  80. State v. Verdicanno, 137 N.C.App. 589 (2000) - Blood test 3 hours later not at a relevant time.
  81. State v. Washington, 668 S.E.2d 622 (2008) - When do police have PC to stop and ask for ID?
  82. Whitaker Partnership v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15 (2004) - Collateral estoppel between DMV and DA on Refusal
  83. State v. White - Def of consecutive tests.
  84. State v. Williams, NO COA09-493 - Only use for PBT=presence of alcohol.

  85. State v. Wimbish, 555 S.E.2d 329 (2001) - Apprendi adopted.
  86. Woolard v. Robertson, DMV Commissioner, NO. COA12-384 Unpublished. Affirms Broyer v. Killens.
  87. Dean Loven opines on chain of custody v. confrontation

    None of the SCOTUS confrontation clause cases address chain of custody. The truth of the content of the laboratory report depends on the results with respect to what was actually tested, not how the item that was tested got to the laboratory. If a mistake was made with respect to what was actually tested due to problems with handling the evidence before it got to the laboratory, that is not a matter within the knowledge of the laboratory analyst.

    Of course it would be unreasonable for an expert opinion to be based upon a sample whether the chain of custody is so weak that a reasonable expert would not rely it for the purpose of saying what sample is actually being tested. However, the laboratory expert will have no idea how the sample was handled before someone in the lab signed it out for analysis.

    For this reason, I believe the chain of custody statutes are separate from the confrontation clause issue. They are a legislatively created definition of the prima facie evidence sufficient to establish the chain of custody with respect to a motion to exclude or to dismiss. Because chain of custody goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence before it is actually tested by the analyst, and because the chain of custody is not an element of a crime, the legislature can define the prima facie evidence to show chain of custody.

    The statute merely states that if the requirements are followed the evidence is admissible. It says nothing about the weight to be given the evidence, which would be improper in a criminal proceeding. It says that because certain
    unobjected to and therefore uncontradicted evidence is presented concerning the chain of custody, the fact finder may (but is not required) to presume the sample analyzed by the analyst is the sample collected by the police.

    If an objection is filed, the statute requires presentation of sufficient evidence from which a fact finder could find the chain of custody is established. The rules of evidence with respect to authentication and hearsay will often allow the person in control of the evidence room to establish procedure the movement of the evidence to and from the property room, while that person's familiarity with the signatures of the persons signing the evidence out will probably establish that an analyst indeed signed the evidence out for analysis. The officer who obtained the sample will generally testify he saw the sample drawn and that he transported it to the property room. In the typical case, that is going to be sufficient. In more complicated cases the chain of custody was, and continues to be fair game.

    Assistant Public Defenderas clarke dummitt says:

    As Clark Dummitt says:

    I learned a great deal from Dean's post (as usual); and I am always very hesitant to ever disagree with Dean (it probably shows my ignorance on this occasion). While I agree with Dean that the Supreme Court has specifically dodged the confrontation issue on chain of custody so far, I do believe it is still the correct constitutional argument, (although probably the third argument, after relevance and a statutory challenge) and not necessary the best way of fighting Chain of Custody.

    Regardless of 6th amendment issues, never let the State get away with the statement that "chain of custody goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence." That is a flat out misrepresentation by the prosecutor's handbook of the three cases which it sites. Read St. v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983), St. v. Bailey, 334 S.E.2d 266 (1985), and St. v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470 (1995). In each of those cases which prosecutors misquote there was a weak link, and not a missing link. A weak link goes to weight, but a missing link goes to admissibility. If the State does not have a Chain of Custody witness there is ipso facto a missing link, not a weak link.

    Clearly you need to have a copy of State v. Ortiz-Zape, ___ N.C. ___, (2013), and State v. Brewington, ___ N.C. ___, (2013), and be familiar with these but they deal more with confrontation limited to a reviewing expert and not the testing expert, the Chain of Custody issue is more basic.

    As the Court held in Melendez-Diaz, "The Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits." As such, the State is required to produce the chemical analyst to appear at trial but, as Dean so ably points out, the Court did not address how chain of custody is to be proven. However the legislature, in response to the Melendez-Diaz decision, amended N.C.G.S. 20-139.1 by adding (c3) which directly addresses how the State must prove chain of custody. I argue to the court that the Supremes had a clear chance to spout some dicta to close this door, but deliberately choose not to, because it is not a closed issue. If the Supremes thought it was even a close call, they would have leaned towards giving the State the benefit of the doubt to "further the important interests of the State" or some such nonsense.

    But even prior to getting to the constitution or the statute, first reeducate the judge about relevance. The Court spelled out in State v. Campbell that the item offered must be identified as being the same object involved in the incident and it must be shown that the object has undergone no material change. "A detailed chain of custody need be established only when the evidence offered is not readily identifiable or is susceptible to alteration and there is reason to believe that it may have been altered." Both are the case with Blood.

    Blood evidence is not evidence that is readily identifiable; one person's red blood looks identical to another person's red blood. To the ordinary observer, without the benefit of sophisticated scientific equipment and specialized training, all blood appears essentially the same and one such sample is indistinguishable from another. Because blood is not readily identifiable, the State must establish a detailed chain of custody regarding the blood sample to be offered into evidence before it can be relevant to the case.

    On the second prong the State will typically argue that "there is [no] reason to believe that it may have been altered," however any judge should know, and any basic biology text book will confirm, blood is a biological material that breaks down over time. A blood sample is susceptible to alteration even if properly stored, but especially if not properly handled in the chain, as the sample can degrade skewing any potential test results (this of course is more complex to get the science in front of a Judge, but it is hard for a prosecutor to say with a straight face that blood is not biologic and doesn't break down, and if they do, call them on it). If the State cannot properly establish an unbroken chain of custody then, by its very biologic nature, reason exists to believe that the blood sample, as originally drawn, exists now in an altered state. Blood changes over time, and scientifically the State must show that the blood as tested is relevant to the blood as drawn, to make it relevant to the guilt or innocence.

    On the statutory issue: Post Melendez-Diaz the legislature amended the laws so that the Defense must now give the State notice of motions to suppress prior to trial, objecting to the proper foundation is not a motion to suppress. The Defendant is not required to file any motion pretrial to point out to the State the weaknesses in their case; nor to advise the prosecutor on how to call witnesses nor how to litigate their case to get proposed evidence properly admitted at trial.

    To be admissible into evidence, the State must lay a foundation for the evidence and introduce testimony sufficient to support a finding that the thing sought to be admitted is in fact what its proponent claims. N.C.G.S. §8C-1, Rule 901(a). This requirement of authentication or identification is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence.

    According to N.C.G.S. 20-139.1 (c3), the State may only use properly signed documents to prove chain of custody if the State notified the Defendant at least 15 business days prior to the proceeding of its intent to use the document and the Defendant does not file notice of objection at least 5 days prior to trial. The Statute, in pertinent part, reads:

    (c3) Procedure for Establishing Chain of Custody Without Calling Unnecessary Witnesses.

    (1) For the purpose of establishing the chain of physical custody or control of blood or urine tested or analyzed to determine whether it contains alcohol, a controlled substance or its metabolite, or any impairing substance, a statement signed by each successive person in the chain of custody that the person delivered it to the other person indicated on or about the date stated is prima facie evidence that the person had custody and made the delivery as stated, without the necessity of a personal appearance in court by the person signing the statement.

    (2) The statement shall contain a sufficient description of the material or its container so as to distinguish it as the particular item in question and shall state that the material was delivered in essentially the same condition as received. The statement may be placed on the same document as the report provided for in subsection (c1) of this section.

    (3) The provisions of this subsection may be utilized in any administrative hearing, but can only be utilized in cases tried in the district and superior court divisions, or in an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court, if:

    a. The State notifies the defendant at least 15 business days before the proceeding at which the statement would be used of its intention to introduce the statement into evidence under this subsection and provides a copy of the statement to the defendant, and

    b. The defendant fails to file a written notification with the court, with a copy to the State, at least five business days before the proceeding at which the statement would be used that the defendant objects to the introduction of the statement into evidence.

    If the defendant's attorney of record, or the defendant if that person has no attorney, fails to file a written objection as provided in this subsection, then the statement shall be admitted into evidence without the necessity of a personal appearance by the person signing the statement. Upon filing a timely objection, the admissibility of the report shall be determined and governed by the appropriate rules of evidence.

    (4) Nothing in this subsection precludes the right of any party to call any witness or to introduce any evidence supporting or contradicting the evidence contained in the statement.

    So long as the Defendant has properly lodged an objection to the introduction of the statements into evidence the State must be able to provide live testimony from each successive person in the chain of custody regarding the blood sample to be introduced as the State cannot provide affidavit's in lieu of sworn testimony over the objection of the Defendant by statute (still undecided by the Supremes as Dean points out).

    Failure to establish the proper foundation for evidence by an unbroken chain of custody renders the evidence inadmissible. In State v. Mason, the appellate Court found the trial testimony, regarding a video tape offered by the State, was insufficient to establish either a proper foundation for accepting the tape into evidence or to establish an unbroken chain of custody. 550 S.E.2d, 15-16 10 (2001). The Court based its findings on the basis that no testimony was presented from any witness who handled the tape. Id. If the State fails to establish a proper foundation for unbroken chain of custody by failure to provide live testimony, the blood evidence is inadmissible.

    State's Typical Argument:

    The State will traditionally argue that a missing Chain of Custody goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility. The State typically, inappropriately, sites State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983), State v. Bailey, 334 S.E.2d 266 (1985); and State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470 (1995). None of these cases hold that a missing link in the chain of custody goes to weight rather than admissibility.

    In State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983) the defense argued that even though the Doctor was present when the blood was drawn, and testified at trial, her testimony was not enough to establish Chain of Custody because the actual person who drew the blood did not testify. The Court ruled that: "Dr. Rita Kay Williams examined the victim shortly after the rape on 22 September 1981. She testified that although she did not actually see the blood drawn from Mrs. Lee, she signed a blood sample that was supposedly taken from the victim by a laboratory technician either immediately before or after the examination. The technician who drew the blood did not testify."

    Thus the Court correctly ruled that while there was a weakness in the Chain, there was not a missing link, the State had adequately shown the link, and the weakness went to weight not admissibility it since she was the supervising doctor, and was present, and testified, to establish the chain of custody.

    In State v. Bailey, 334 S.E.2d 266 (1985) the defense argued that the State had not proven that ALL possible flaws in the procedures had been eliminated. It was a specious argument that had nothing to do with Chain of Custody: "As to the reliability of the specimen for testing, defendant argues that the State failed to produce evidence that the specimen was not contaminated by testing or by procedures in obtaining the specimen, such as the use of an alcohol swab on defendant's arm or sterilization of the sampling apparatus in alcohol. There was no evidence elicited on direct or cross-examination of the technologist [note: the person testified, but was not asked questions about the procedures] as to the procedures employed in drawing the specimen, or whether any tests were, in fact, performed on it at the Onslow Memorial Hospital laboratory. The State is not required to negate every possible flaw in the testing procedure in order for the results of the chemical analysis to be admissible, it is only required that the State show compliance with the provisions of G.S. 20-139.1. In this case, through its evidence and the defendant's stipulation, the State met its burden of proving compliance with the statute so as to render the evidence admissible. Defendant's argument that the State has failed to show the nonexistence of flaws in the procedures more properly relates to the weight to be given the evidence by the jury, rather than its admissibility."

    In State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470 (1995):" Defendant objected to the portion of Elwell's testimony that relied on Exhibit 22 and to the exhibit's admission into evidence on the sole ground that "there was no testimony from anyone as to who drew that blood or when it was drawn or, in fact, that it was drawn from Mr. Ralph Childress."

    As to the ground for objection properly preserved, this Court has stated that the person who draws a blood sample need not always testify to establish a proper foundation for the admission of the sample. State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 632-33, 300 S.E.2d 351, 353-54 (1983). In Grier, the first link of the chain of custody was sufficiently proven because a doctor who had examined a rape victim "testified that although she did not actually see the blood drawn from [the victim], she signed a blood sample that was supposedly taken from the victim by a laboratory technician either immediately before or after the examination. The technician who drew the blood did not testify." Id. at 632, 300 S.E.2d at 353. We concluded that "[a]ny weakness in the chain of custody relate[d] only to the weight"

    All three of the cases which the State typically argues are NOT cases where there are missing links, but merely weak links. These cases in fact affirm the rule of law that the State must prove chain of custody, and if they do not then lay the proper foundation then the evidence is not admissible. In fact State v. Bailey, 334 S.E.2d 266 (1985) affirms the argument that the State must comply with "the provisions of G.S. 20-139.1..." in proving chain of custody, and the new provisions require each person in the chain to sign the statement that the blood was receive and passed on without being altered or contaminated, but only allows these signed statements if the Defendant does not file an objection in writing. As long as you properly objected, then the State must call the witnesses and prove the Chain and allow 6th amendment confrontation.

    So yes, I think the 6th amendment is still alive and well in "missing links" in Chain of Custody, but more than that, the legislature gave us a great framework in N.C.G.S. 20-139.1 (c3), and basic "relevance" is still a fundamental hurtle for the State before they can even get to the statutory, and then the constitutional issues.

    While I am a practical litigator, and I recognize that in District Court so many judges will not listen, I think it is our obligation to bludgeon judges and DAs with the law in very case regardless of the futility. Slowly, after hearing it enough, you will start to make progress, or at least you will punish the Judges who will not follow the law by making them miss their golf game. Educate your Judges, don't leave it to the Institute of Government and the prosecutors.

    Clarke Dummit
  88. shea denning's take on stoned driving
  89. nhtsa says stoned can't be proven with blood
  90. Combs v. Robertson, Commissioner of the NC DMV NO. COA14-709 (2015) - The 4th Amendment does not apply in DMV Hearings.
  91. State v. Snead, 2015 WL 659745 (2015) - Authenticating and Introducing Video

Probable Cause Cases
  1. Alford v. Devenpeck, 125 S.ct 588 (2004) - Probably Cause - Amnesty officer’s state of mind not important.
  2. State v. Ange, 151 N.C.App. 297 (2002) - Seizure defined.
  3. Atkins v. Moye, (1970) - Need more than odor or drinking.
  4. State v. Bartlett, No. COA97-999 (1998) - Alka sensor not admissible. If not sure controlled substance, cont seize.
  5. Bostick v. FL, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) - Probably Cause when is encounter a seizure.
  6. State v. Branch, 591 S.E.2d (2004) Falana upheld - Reasonable Suspicion more after checkpoint.
  7. State v. Bruder, 488 U.S. (1988) - Ordinary traffic stop not a seizure that requires Miranda.
  8. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332 (2001) - Objective? Formal arrest or restraint?
  9. State v. Carrouthers, NO.COA09-31 - Handcuffs not equal to arrest. Bad case.
  10. State v. Cothran, 463 S.E.2d (1995) - Per se .08 case
  11. Dunaway v. NY, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) - Seizure? Yes here.
  12. State v. Falana, 501 S,E,2d 358 (1998) - Once original of stop done, need Reasonable Suspicion. "Nervous" is not enough.
  13. State v. Fisher, No. COA99-1222 - After Officer’s stop need Reasonable Suspicion for further detention.
  14. State v. Helms, 504 S.E.2d 293 (1998) - HGN not admissible.
  15. Holman v. OH, 99-1107 (2000) - FST’s require STRICT compliance
  16. State v. Icard, NO. 236A08 (2009) - Good case for need Probably Cause to detain and?
  17. State v. Jeffries, 17 N.C.App. 195 (1972) - Probably Cause: officer must have reasonable grounds to believe offense has occurred here: NG DWI!
  18. State v. Myles, 654 S.E.2d 752 (2008) - Affirms Falana. Nervous not enough to continue holding defendant.
  19. Pringle v. MD, 124 S.Ct. 795 (2005) - Probably Cause  need particularized suspicion.
  20. State v. Rich, 527 S.E.2d 299 (2000) - PBT not equal to Probably Cause  - DA uses this case.
  21. State v. Rogers, 124 N.C.App. 364 (1996) - State’s PBT case
  22. Royer v. Florida, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) - RS and Probably Cause to arrest
  23. State v. Sellars, No. COA11-1315 (2012) - Fisher/Falana de minimis delay= all ok. Bad
  24. Stansbury v. CA, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (1994) - Custody is objective question.
  25. Whren v. US, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) - Probably Cause is objective question.
  26. State v. Williams, No.COA09-493 (2010) - PBT positive= presence of alcohol.
  27. State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251 (1984) - Probably Cause standard reasonable caution.
  28. State v. Sewell , NO.COA14-269 (2015) 6&6 HGN and Positive PVT is not PC.

Wreck Cases (including Blood Test Cases)

  1. 1. Atkins v. Moye, N.C. 106, 161 S.E.2d 568 (1970) -  Need more than odor or drinking.
  2. 2. State v. Cooke, 270 N.C.App. 644 (1967)  - Blood Test case. Drunk at time of driving is all that’s relevant.
  3. 3. State v. Cox, ___ N.C.App. ___ , No. COA11–609–2 (August 07, 2012)  - Corpus delicti needs evidence of opportunity or other corroborative evidence.
  4. 4. State v. Cruz, 173 N.C. App. 689, 620 S.E.2d 251 (2005)  - Refines Trexler; also-GAF child must be found by jury.
  5. 5. State v. Hairr, 244 N.C. 506 (1956)  - Drinking ok- need intoxicated.
  6. 6. Milton v. Shaffer, 126 N.C. App. 197 (1994)  - Blood test chain of custody.
  7. 7. State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985)  - Sets out rule in non-capital case when state relies on defendant’s confession to obtain a conviction. No longer necessary that there be independent proof tending to establish corpus delecti of the crime charged if the accused’s confession supported by substantial independent evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness including facts tending to show defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime.
  8. 8. State v. Patterson, NO. COA10-538 (2011)  - Reduces impact of Verdicanno.
  9. 9. State v. Ray, 54 N.C. App. 473 (1981)  - Trexler case.
  10. 10. Robinson v. Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 669 (1961)  - Blood test before any other substance injected.
  11. 11. State v. Scott, 146 N.C. App. 283 (2001)  - Need more than slurred speech to prove impaired.
  12. 12. State v. Smith, 669 S.E.2d 299 (2008)  - Court held there was not sufficient evidence to get around corpus delecti problem.
  13. 13. State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. App. 528 (1986)  - Corpus delecti rule; a defendant’s admission to an element of crime is not enough to prove that element.

Wrecks - Miscellaneous

  1. Paul Glover Testimony Hospital Blood Test objections

Miscellaneous PDFs

  1. Alco-Sensor Owner's Manual & Alco-Sensor III Owner's Manual
  2. BAC & Absorption and Elimination
  3. Breath Test Accuracy
  4. IOG Article on Passing
  5. Cellular Respiration and Fermentation
  6. District Attorney's Duty to Disclose
  7. DWI Grossly Aggravating Factors (list by MH)
  8. DWI Grossly Aggravating Factors 2
  9. Effects of Hyperthermia on Breath-Alcohol Analysis
  10. FST Evaluation Science
  11. FST Guide
  12. HGN Cross-Examination
  13. NHTSA Validation of FST's
  14. SFST Manual-Differences
  15. State v Fowler Flow Chart by Kerry Sutton
  16. Temperature Defense