Anonymous Tips
-
State v Allen, 676
S.E.2d 519 (2009) - In person tip more
reliable. Good law discussion for the State.
-
State v Brown, 142
N.C.App. 332 (2001) - Anonymous tip not
enough-follows Florida v. J.L.
-
State v Coleman, NO.COA12-1173 (2012)
- Not
enough here to stop.
-
State v Cooper, 186
N.C.App. 100 (2007) - Anonymous tip not
enough to stop.
-
State v Crowell,
NO.COA09-635 Unpublished - Not anonymous tip proven if tipster reliable.
-
State v Garcia, 677
S.E.2d 555 (2009) - A less than
reliable anonymous tip may still provide a basis
for reasonable suspicion if supported by
sufficient police corroboration.
-
Harris
v Commonwealth of VA, 262 Va. 407 (2001)
-
Anonymous tip not enough
-
State v Harwood, NO.
COA11-1513 - Anonymous Tip not ok.
Seizure when defendant blocked in by officers
(+more)
-
State v Hudgins, 672
S.E.2d 717 (2009) - Anonymous tip, bad
case.
-
State v Hughes, 353
N.C. 200 (2000) - Anonymous tip, good
case.
-
U.S. v Hughes, 517
F.3d 1013 (2008) - Anonymous tip not
enough to pat down.
-
FL v J.L., 529 U.S.
266 (2000) - Anonymous tip rules.
-
State v Maready, 362
N.C. 614 (2008) - Anonymous tip, bad
case.
-
State v McArn, 159
N.C.App. 209 (2003) - Need details of
crime, not just behavior, to get to Reasonable
Suspicion.
-
State v Morton, 346
S.E.2d 437 (2009) - Good case.
Anonymous tip reliability.
-
State v Peele, 675
S.E.2d 682 (2009) - Anonymous tip and
weaving not Reasonable Suspicion.
-
U.S. v Reaves, 512
F.3d 123 (2008) - Anonymous tip alone
not enough.
-
State v Robinson, 148
N.C.App. 462 (2002) - Anonymous tip not
enough, but search ok.
-
State v Sanchez, 147
N.C.App. 619 (2001) - Face-to-face
informant tip reliable.
-
State v Young, 148
N.C.App. 462 (2002) - Reasonable Suspicion is objective,
anonymous tip ok here.
Wreck Cases (including Blood Test Cases)
- Atkins v. Moye, N.C. 106, 161 S.E.2d 568
(1970) - Need more than odor or drinking.
- State v. Cooke, 270 N.C.App. 644 (1967)
- Blood Test case. Drunk at time of driving is all
that’s relevant.
- State v. Cox, ___ N.C.App. ___ , No.
COA11–609–2 (August 07, 2012) - Corpus delicti
needs evidence of opportunity or other
corroborative evidence.
- State v. Cruz, 173 N.C. App. 689, 620
S.E.2d 251 (2005) - Refines Trexler; also-GAF
child must be found by jury.
- State v. Hairr, 244 N.C. 506 (1956)
- Drinking ok- need intoxicated.
- Milton v. Shaffer, 126 N.C. App. 197
(1994) - Blood test chain of custody.
- State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985)
- Sets out rule in non-capital case when state
relies on defendant’s confession to obtain a
conviction. No longer necessary that there be
independent proof tending to establish corpus delecti of the crime charged if the accused’s
confession supported by substantial independent
evidence tending to establish its
trustworthiness including facts tending to show
defendant had the opportunity to commit the
crime.
- State v. Patterson, NO. COA10-538 (2011)
- Reduces impact of Verdicanno.
- State v. Ray, 54 N.C. App. 473 (1981)
- Trexler case.
- Robinson v. Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 669 (1961)
- Blood test before any other substance injected.
- State v. Scott, 146 N.C. App. 283 (2001)
- Need more than slurred speech to prove impaired.
- State v. Smith, 669 S.E.2d 299 (2008)
- Court held there was not sufficient evidence to
get around corpus delecti problem.
- State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. App. 528
(1986) - Corpus delecti rule; a defendant’s
admission to an element of crime is not enough
to prove that element.
Chain of Custody v. Confrontation
Dean Loven opines on chain of custody v. confrontation
None of the
SCOTUS confrontation clause
cases address chain of custody. The truth of
the content of the laboratory report depends
on the results with respect to what was
actually tested, not how the item that was
tested got to the laboratory. If a mistake
was made with respect to what was actually
tested due to problems with handling the
evidence before it got to the laboratory,
that is not a matter within the knowledge of
the laboratory analyst.
Of course it would be unreasonable for an
expert opinion to be based upon a sample
whether the chain of custody is so weak that
a reasonable expert would not rely it for
the purpose of saying what sample is
actually being tested. However, the
laboratory expert will have no idea how the
sample was handled before someone in the lab
signed it out for analysis.
For this reason, I believe the chain of
custody statutes are separate from the
confrontation clause issue. They are a
legislatively created definition of the
prima facie evidence sufficient to establish
the chain of custody with respect to a
motion to exclude or to dismiss. Because
chain of custody goes to the weight and not
the admissibility of the evidence before it
is actually tested by the analyst, and
because the chain of custody is not an
element of a crime, the legislature can
define the prima facie evidence to show
chain of custody.
The statute merely states that if the
requirements are followed the evidence is
admissible. It says nothing about the weight
to be given the evidence, which would be
improper in a criminal proceeding. It says
that because certain unobjected to and
therefore uncontradicted evidence is
presented concerning the chain of custody,
the fact finder may (but is not required) to
presume the sample analyzed by the analyst
is the sample collected by the police.
If an objection is filed, the statute
requires presentation of sufficient evidence
from which a fact finder could find the
chain of custody is established. The rules
of evidence with respect to authentication
and hearsay will often allow the person in
control of the evidence room to establish
procedure the movement of the evidence to
and from the property room, while that
person's familiarity with the signatures of
the persons signing the evidence out will
probably establish that an analyst indeed
signed the evidence out for analysis. The
officer who obtained the sample will
generally testify he saw the sample drawn
and that he transported it to the property
room. In the typical case, that is going to
be sufficient. In more complicated cases the
chain of custody was, and continues to be
fair game.
Dean Loven
Assistant Public Defenderas clarke dummitt
says:
As Clark Dummitt says:
I learned a great deal from Dean's post (as
usual); and I am always very hesitant to
ever disagree with Dean (it probably shows
my ignorance on this occasion). While I
agree with Dean that the Supreme Court has
specifically dodged the confrontation issue
on chain of custody so far, I do believe it
is still the correct constitutional
argument, (although probably the third
argument, after relevance and a statutory
challenge) and not necessary the best way of
fighting Chain of Custody.
Regardless of 6th amendment issues, never
let the State get away with the statement
that "chain of custody goes to the weight
and not the admissibility of the evidence."
That is a flat out misrepresentation by the
prosecutor's handbook of the three cases
which it sites. Read St. v. Grier, 300
S.E.2d 351 (1983), St. v. Bailey, 334 S.E.2d
266 (1985), and St. v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470
(1995). In each of those cases which
prosecutors misquote there was a weak link,
and not a missing link. A weak link goes to
weight, but a missing link goes to
admissibility. If the State does not have a
Chain of Custody witness there is ipso facto
a missing link, not a weak link.
Clearly you need to have a copy of State v.
Ortiz-Zape, ___ N.C. ___, (2013), and State
v. Brewington, ___ N.C. ___, (2013), and be
familiar with these but they deal more with
confrontation limited to a reviewing expert
and not the testing expert, the Chain of
Custody issue is more basic.
As the Court held in Melendez-Diaz, "The
Sixth Amendment does not permit the
prosecution to prove its case via ex parte
out-of-court affidavits." As such, the State
is required to produce the chemical analyst
to appear at trial but, as Dean so ably
points out, the Court did not address how
chain of custody is to be proven. However
the legislature, in response to the Melendez-Diaz
decision, amended N.C.G.S. 20-139.1 by
adding (c3) which directly addresses how the
State must prove chain of custody. I argue
to the court that the Supremes had a clear
chance to spout some dicta to close this
door, but deliberately choose not to,
because it is not a closed issue. If the
Supremes thought it was even a close call,
they would have leaned towards giving the
State the benefit of the doubt to "further
the important interests of the State" or
some such nonsense.
But even prior to getting to the
constitution or the statute, first reeducate
the judge about relevance. The Court spelled
out in State v. Campbell that the item
offered must be identified as being the same
object involved in the incident and it must
be shown that the object has undergone no
material change. "A detailed chain of
custody need be established only when the
evidence offered is not readily identifiable
or is susceptible to alteration and there is
reason to believe that it may have been
altered." Both are the case with Blood.
Blood evidence is not evidence that is
readily identifiable; one person's red blood
looks identical to another person's red
blood. To the ordinary observer, without the
benefit of sophisticated scientific
equipment and specialized training, all
blood appears essentially the same and one
such sample is indistinguishable from
another. Because blood is not readily
identifiable, the State must establish a
detailed chain of custody regarding the
blood sample to be offered into evidence
before it can be relevant to the case.
On the second prong the State will typically
argue that "there is [no] reason to believe
that it may have been altered," however any
judge should know, and any basic biology
text book will confirm, blood is a
biological material that breaks down over
time. A blood sample is susceptible to
alteration even if properly stored, but
especially if not properly handled in the
chain, as the sample can degrade skewing any
potential test results (this of course is
more complex to get the science in front of
a Judge, but it is hard for a prosecutor to
say with a straight face that blood is not
biologic and doesn't break down, and if they
do, call them on it). If the State cannot
properly establish an unbroken chain of
custody then, by its very biologic nature,
reason exists to believe that the blood
sample, as originally drawn, exists now in
an altered state. Blood changes over time,
and scientifically the State must show that
the blood as tested is relevant to the blood
as drawn, to make it relevant to the guilt
or innocence.
On the statutory issue: Post Melendez-Diaz
the legislature amended the laws so that the
Defense must now give the State notice of
motions to suppress prior to trial,
objecting to the proper foundation is not a
motion to suppress. The Defendant is not
required to file any motion pretrial to
point out to the State the weaknesses in
their case; nor to advise the prosecutor on
how to call witnesses nor how to litigate
their case to get proposed evidence properly
admitted at trial.
To be admissible into evidence, the State
must lay a foundation for the evidence and
introduce testimony sufficient to support a
finding that the thing sought to be admitted
is in fact what its proponent claims.
N.C.G.S. §8C-1, Rule 901(a). This
requirement of authentication or
identification is a condition precedent to
the admissibility of evidence.
According to N.C.G.S. 20-139.1 (c3), the
State may only use properly signed documents
to prove chain of custody if the State
notified the Defendant at least 15 business
days prior to the proceeding of its intent
to use the document and the Defendant does
not file notice of objection at least 5 days
prior to trial. The Statute, in pertinent
part, reads:
(c3) Procedure for Establishing Chain of
Custody Without Calling Unnecessary
Witnesses.
(1) For the purpose of establishing the
chain of physical custody or control of
blood or urine tested or analyzed to
determine whether it contains alcohol, a
controlled substance or its metabolite, or
any impairing substance, a statement signed
by each successive person in the chain of
custody that the person delivered it to the
other person indicated on or about the date
stated is prima facie evidence that the
person had custody and made the delivery as
stated, without the necessity of a personal
appearance in court by the person signing
the statement.
(2) The statement shall contain a sufficient
description of the material or its container
so as to distinguish it as the particular
item in question and shall state that the
material was delivered in essentially the
same condition as received. The statement
may be placed on the same document as the
report provided for in subsection (c1) of
this section.
(3) The provisions of this subsection may be
utilized in any administrative hearing, but
can only be utilized in cases tried in the
district and superior court divisions, or in
an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court,
if:
a. The State notifies the defendant at least
15 business days before the proceeding at
which the statement would be used of its
intention to introduce the statement into
evidence under this subsection and provides
a copy of the statement to the defendant,
and
b. The defendant fails to file a written
notification with the court, with a copy to
the State, at least five business days
before the proceeding at which the statement
would be used that the defendant objects to
the introduction of the statement into
evidence.
If the defendant's attorney of record, or
the defendant if that person has no
attorney, fails to file a written objection
as provided in this subsection, then the
statement shall be admitted into evidence
without the necessity of a personal
appearance by the person signing the
statement. Upon filing a timely objection,
the admissibility of the report shall be
determined and governed by the appropriate
rules of evidence.
(4) Nothing in this subsection precludes the
right of any party to call any witness or to
introduce any evidence supporting or
contradicting the evidence contained in the
statement.
So long as the Defendant has properly lodged
an objection to the introduction of the
statements into evidence the State must be
able to provide live testimony from each
successive person in the chain of custody
regarding the blood sample to be introduced
as the State cannot provide affidavit's in
lieu of sworn testimony over the objection
of the Defendant by statute (still undecided
by the Supremes as Dean points out).
Failure to establish the proper foundation
for evidence by an unbroken chain of custody
renders the evidence inadmissible. In State
v. Mason, the appellate Court found the
trial testimony, regarding a video tape
offered by the State, was insufficient to
establish either a proper foundation for
accepting the tape into evidence or to
establish an unbroken chain of custody. 550
S.E.2d, 15-16 10 (2001). The Court based its
findings on the basis that no testimony was
presented from any witness who handled the
tape. Id. If the State fails to establish a
proper foundation for unbroken chain of
custody by failure to provide live
testimony, the blood evidence is
inadmissible.
State's Typical Argument:
The State will traditionally argue that a
missing Chain of Custody goes to the weight
of the evidence and not to its
admissibility. The State typically,
inappropriately, sites State v. Grier, 300
S.E.2d 351 (1983), State v. Bailey, 334
S.E.2d 266 (1985); and State v. Frye, 341
N.C. 470 (1995). None of these cases hold
that a missing link in the chain of custody
goes to weight rather than admissibility.
In State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983) the
defense argued that even though the Doctor
was present when the blood was drawn, and
testified at trial, her testimony was not
enough to establish Chain of Custody because
the actual person who drew the blood did not
testify. The Court ruled that: "Dr. Rita Kay
Williams examined the victim shortly after
the rape on 22 September 1981. She testified
that although she did not actually see the
blood drawn from Mrs. Lee, she signed a
blood sample that was supposedly taken from
the victim by a laboratory technician either
immediately before or after the examination.
The technician who drew the blood did not
testify."
Thus the Court correctly ruled that while
there was a weakness in the Chain, there was
not a missing link, the State had adequately
shown the link, and the weakness went to
weight not admissibility it since she was
the supervising doctor, and was present, and
testified, to establish the chain of
custody.
In State v. Bailey, 334 S.E.2d 266 (1985)
the defense argued that the State had not
proven that ALL possible flaws in the
procedures had been eliminated. It was a
specious argument that had nothing to do
with Chain of Custody: "As to the
reliability of the specimen for testing,
defendant argues that the State failed to
produce evidence that the specimen was not
contaminated by testing or by procedures in
obtaining the specimen, such as the use of
an alcohol swab on defendant's arm or
sterilization of the sampling apparatus in
alcohol. There was no evidence elicited on
direct or cross-examination of the
technologist [note: the person testified,
but was not asked questions about the
procedures] as to the procedures employed in
drawing the specimen, or whether any tests
were, in fact, performed on it at the Onslow
Memorial Hospital laboratory. The State is
not required to negate every possible flaw
in the testing procedure in order for the
results of the chemical analysis to be
admissible, it is only required that the
State show compliance with the provisions of
G.S. 20-139.1. In this case, through its
evidence and the defendant's stipulation,
the State met its burden of proving
compliance with the statute so as to render
the evidence admissible. Defendant's
argument that the State has failed to show
the nonexistence of flaws in the procedures
more properly relates to the weight to be
given the evidence by the jury, rather than
its admissibility."
In State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470 (1995):"
Defendant objected to the portion of
Elwell's testimony that relied on Exhibit 22
and to the exhibit's admission into evidence
on the sole ground that "there was no
testimony from anyone as to who drew that
blood or when it was drawn or, in fact, that
it was drawn from Mr. Ralph Childress."
As to the ground for objection properly
preserved, this Court has stated that the
person who draws a blood sample need not
always testify to establish a proper
foundation for the admission of the sample.
State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 632-33, 300
S.E.2d 351, 353-54 (1983). In Grier, the
first link of the chain of custody was
sufficiently proven because a doctor who had
examined a rape victim "testified that
although she did not actually see the blood
drawn from [the victim], she signed a blood
sample that was supposedly taken from the
victim by a laboratory technician either
immediately before or after the examination.
The technician who drew the blood did not
testify." Id. at 632, 300 S.E.2d at 353. We
concluded that "[a]ny weakness in the chain
of custody relate[d] only to the weight"
All three of the cases which the State
typically argues are NOT cases where there
are missing links, but merely weak links.
These cases in fact affirm the rule of law
that the State must prove chain of custody,
and if they do not then lay the proper
foundation then the evidence is not
admissible. In fact State v. Bailey, 334
S.E.2d 266 (1985) affirms the argument that
the State must comply with "the provisions
of G.S. 20-139.1..." in proving chain of
custody, and the new provisions require each
person in the chain to sign the statement
that the blood was receive and passed on
without being altered or contaminated, but
only allows these signed statements if the
Defendant does not file an objection in
writing. As long as you properly objected,
then the State must call the witnesses and
prove the Chain and allow 6th amendment
confrontation.
So yes, I think the 6th amendment is still
alive and well in "missing links" in Chain
of Custody, but more than that, the
legislature gave us a great framework in
N.C.G.S. 20-139.1 (c3), and basic
"relevance" is still a fundamental hurtle
for the State before they can even get to
the statutory, and then the constitutional
issues.
While I am a practical litigator, and I
recognize that in District Court so many
judges will not listen, I think it is our
obligation to bludgeon judges and DAs with
the law in very case regardless of the
futility. Slowly, after hearing it enough,
you will start to make progress, or at least
you will punish the Judges who will not
follow the law by making them miss their
golf game. Educate your Judges, don't leave
it to the Institute of Government and the
prosecutors.
Clarke Dummit
Knoll Cases
- State v Burns, NO.COA08-1181 Unpublished.
- State must provide a
phone calls all #’s or breath test
supervised.
- State v Eliason, 100 N.C. App. 313, 395
S.E.2d 702 (1990) - Good explanation of the
three cases considered in State v. Knoll; in
this case it was found that defendant’s
constitutional rights were not violated.
- State v Elson, No. COA98-125, affirmed
by 130 N.C.App. 760 (1998) - State’s burden to
prove no violation if refusal or no chemical
test.
- State v Ferguson, 90 N.C. App. 513, 369
S.E.2d 378 (1998) - Case should be dismissed
when a defendant is denied access to a
potential witness after the witness arrived
in a timely fashion and made a reasonable
effort to gain access to the defendant.
- State v Gilbert, 85 N.C. App. 594; 355
S.E.2d 261 (1987) - Need to show prejudice if
the breath tests result is .08 or above to
get relief.
- State v Haas, 131 N.C. App. 113, 505
S.E.2d 311(1998) - Defendant needs to show
prejudice. Bad case.
- State v Ham, 105 N.C. App. 658, 414
S.E.2d 577 (1992) - Defendant needs to show
prejudice. Here a one hour delay was not
prejudicial.
- State v Hatley, 661 S.E.2d 43 (2008)
- Knoll violated; but defendant also must show
prejudice.
- State v Hayes, 188 N.C. App. 313 (2008)
- Knoll violated, defendant must also show
prejudice.
- State v Hill, 277 N.C. App. 547 (1971)
- Refusal of the jailer to permit the
defendant’s attorney to see him is
inherently prejudicial. (Knoll is based on
this case.)
- State v Labinski, 654 S.E.2d 740 (2008)
- Defendant must show prejudice in order to be
successful in arguing a Knoll violation.
- State v. Myers, 118 N.C. App. 452, 455
S.E.2d 492 (1995) - The defendant
unequivocally asked that his wife be
permitted to observe the taking of the
breathalyzer test. Officer made a statement
that “that might not be a good idea.”
Officer had no right to refuse that request
and so charges must be dismissed.
- State v. Knoll, 322 N.C. App. 535 (1988)
- Delay in releasing a defendant from custody
after being charged with DWI can cause
irrevocable prejudice, justifying dismissal
of case.
Knoll - Miscellaneous
- State v. Rao (Memorandum of Law by
Marcus on Knoll)
- State v. Tuckett (Memo of Law) When cops
deny witness’ access to FSTs, they violate
Knoll.
- Memorandum of law #2 on Knoll by Marcus.
Miscellaneous Cases
- State v. Absher, Unpublished. - Destruction
of Video Evidence.
- State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425 (2005) - Adopts
Blakely and Apprendi. Jury decides punishment
beyond reasonable doubt.
- State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981)
- Constructive possession of gun not imputed to
passenger.
- State v. Apprendi, 731 A. 2d 485 (1999)
- Aggravating factors must be proven to jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
- State v. Barron, NO. COA09-770
- Constructive possession. Not enough to just be
in the room.
- State v. Bartlett, 130 N.C. App. 79 (1998) - Alka-sensor not admissible- if not sure
controlled substance, can't seize.
- WA v. Blakely, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) - Apprendi adopted.
- State v. Blocker - Boykin allowed
- Boykin v. AL, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed (1969)
- AF’s.
- State v. Bordeaux, NO. COA09-1484
- Confession involuntarily even after Miranda.
- Brady v. MD, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194
(1963) - DA must disclose all potentially
exculpatory info.
- State v. Brennan, NO. COA09-1362
- Melendez-Diaz one expert can’t test another’s
opinion.
- State v. Buchanan, 355 N.C. 264, 559
S.E.2d 785(2002) See also State v. Buchanan 543
S.E.2d 823 (2001). - The test for arrest is
whether reasonable person in defendant's place
would have believed in custody, not officers
subjective intent.
- State v. Buckner, 34 N.C. App. 447, 238
S.E.2d 635(1977) - 30 minute wait required if
defendant exercises right to witness.
- State v. Burrow NO.COA11-773 M-D, -
Officer
can’t testify re-pills, need lab analyst.
- Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. __ (Jan. 10,
2011) - Great Brady case. Specifically, "Boatner’s
testimony was the only evidence linking Smith to
the crime. Also, Boatner’s undisclosed
statements directly contradicted his testimony.
Boatner’s undisclosed statements, the Court
concluded, were plainly material."
- State v. Cao, 175 N.C. App. 434, 626
S.E.2d 301 (2006) - Crawford-records ok if only
objective facts, no opinions. (Before
Melendez-Diaz)
- State v. Carrouthers, NO. COA-1470
- Handcuffs are not necessarily custody. Bad case!
- State v. Catoe, 78 N.C. App. 167, 336
S.E.2d 691(1985) E - xtrapolation evidence ok
sometimes.
- State v. Clark, 12 Ired. 151, 1851 WL
1154 N.C. (1851) - Expert witness.
- State v. Coffey, 658 S.E.2d 73 (2008)
- Indef. extension of revocation for no 508 is
GAF.
- State v. Cooke, 270 N.C. 644, 155 S.E.2d
165 (1967) - Blood test case-drunk at time of
accident is all that is relevant.
- State v. Cothran, 463 S.E.2d 423(1995)
- Bad case; .08 is enough.
- Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct.
1354,158 L.Ed. 177 (2004) - Defendant has the
right to confront witnesses against him
(Melendez-Diaz based on this case).
- State v. Cruz, 173 N.C.App. 689 (2005)
- Melendez-Diaz @ Sentencing.
- D&W Inc v City of Charlotte, 152 SE 2d
199 (1966) - D/C & S/C must follow NC Ct App & NCSC cases even if stayed;
- WA v. Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)
- Definition of testimonial: statements made to
cops where primary purpose is to meet emergency
needs are not testimonial (here 911 call).
- State v. Davis, 142 N.C. App. 81, 542
S.E.2d 236(2001) - Refusal and blood test
admissible.
- State v. Delaney, 613 S.E.2d 699 (2005)
- Expert may use info from other experts to opine.
- State v. Fletcher, 688 S.E.2d 94 (2010)
- Blood draw w/out warrant ok if exigent
circumstances. Bad case.
- State v. Ford, 164 N.C.App. 566 (2004)
- PBT not admissible unless statue specifically
allows.
- State v. Fortney, 687 SE 2d 518 (2010)
- Record points for out of state law-process.
- State v. Fowler, 676 S.E.2d 523 (2009)
2006 - DWI statue/procedure reviewed and okayed.
(Sorry Bill!)
- State v. Friend, No. COA11-572 ST VD - Re-charge is okay.
- ND v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454 (2008)
- Community caretaking exception not applicable in
a dwelling.
- State v. Hairr, 244 N.C. 506 (1956)
I - nsufficient for a 20-138 conviction for the
court to show that a def drove an auto on a
highway within the state when he has drunk a
sufficient quantity of intoxicating liquor to
affect however slightly his mental or physical
faculties. Must show loss of normal control and
appreciable impairment.
- State v. Hanton, 623 SE 2d 600 (2006)
- What is similar off to NC offense?
- State of Florida v. Harris, - Dog Sniff is
not necessarily pc.
- State v. Hatley, 661 S.E.2d 43 (2008)
- Witness arrives on time and not allowed to be
witness-not to suppress intox result allowed.
- State v. Hearst, 356 NC 312, (2001)
- Inpatient credit for Habitual DWI?.
- State v. Hensley, 190 N.C. App. 600
(2008) - Possession of alcohol-need evidence of
what was in the bottle.
- U.S. v. Herring, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009)
- Exclusion not always warranted by evidence mix
up.
- State v. Hewitt, 263 N.C. 759 (1965) - But:
no evidence of impairment after 4 beers and 1
whiskey.
- OH v. Homan, 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 (2000) - FST's require strict compliance.
- Howerton v. Helmet, LTD, 581 S.E.2d 816
(2003) S - tandards for experts-not Daubert!
- State v. Hudgins, 606 S.E.2d 443(2005)
- Necessity defense.
- State v. Jenkins, 527 S.E.2d 672 (2000) - DV-pretrial release case.
- State v. Joe, 711 S.E.2d 842 (2011) - No RDO by running if consensual encounter.
- U.S. v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137 (2005)
- Community caretaking exception to warrant
requirement.
- U.S. v. King, 628 F.3d 693 (2011) - Brady
violation-if evidence could be exculpatory, must
be disclosed.
- State v. Lawson, 285 N.C. 320, 204 S.E.2d
843(1974) - Miranda upheld: statement excluded.
- Lee v. Gore, NO. COA09-370-2 - Refusal must
be willful and affidavit must be correct to
support suspension. Affirmed by Supremes.
- State v. Lewis, 603 S.E.2d 559 (2004)
- Crawford case
- State v. Lloyd, 33 N.C. App. 370, 235
S.E.2d 281(1977) - 30 min wait not necessary unless
defendant exercises rights to witness.
- State v. Madry, 140 NC App 600 (2000)
- Warrant must allege all facts necessary.
- State v. Matias, 556 S.E.2d 269 (2001)
- Constructive possession (diff. from Weems.)
- MA v. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. 2527
(2009) - Right to confrontation extends to lab
techs.
- State v. McBride, 109 NCApp 64 (1993)
- When can court use other charge as agg. factor.
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 US 419 (1995) - Brady
Revised.
- State v. McKown, 236 Ill.2d 278 (2010)
- HGN unless some alcohol not an amount.
- State v. Messick, NO. COA090-940
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ____ (2013)
- No blood without warrant.
- State v. Moore, 513 S.E.2d 346 (1999)
- Positive test for drugs not equal to impaired.
- State v. Morgan, 362 N.C. 686 (2008) - DWI
pre-2006 amendments-State's appeal rights limited.
- Atkins v. Moye, 277 N.C. 179 (1970) - Odor
(of alcohol) standing alone is no evidence that
he is under influence of an intoxicant and the
mere fact that he has had a drink will not
support such a finding.
- State v. Myers, 118 N.C. App. 452, 455
S.E.2d 492(1995) - When defendant requests
witness, state must allow.
- State v. Nabors, No.COA10-176 (2010) - Cop
ID of drugs not enough to prove.
- State v. Narron, 666 S.E.2d 860 (2008)
- Per se rule .08 not an irrebutable presumption.
- State v. Oates, __ N.C. App. __, __
S.E.2d __ (June 21, 2011) (Link).
- The State failed to give proper notice of appeal
from the trial court’s order granting the
defendant’s motion to suppress. The State filed
written notice of appeal after the trial judge
granted the defendant’s motion in open court but
before the trial court entered the written
order. Although judgment occurs when the
sentence is pronounced, entry of an order occurs
when it is reduced to writing, signed by the
trial court, and filed with the clerk. The State
failed to file written notice of appeal within
14 days after entry of the court’s order.
- State v. Palmer, 676 S.E.2d 559 (2009)
- Post 2006 procedure in State's appeal of DWI
pretrial motions.
- State v. Powell, 666 F.3d 180 - Not a car
case. NO Reasonable Suspicion for patdown.
- State v. Perry, NO. COA03-1419 - Search
warrant does not allow search of all people
present.
- State v. Rivens, 679 S.E.2d 145 (2009)
- LEO's have right to approach residence and ask
questions.
- Robinson v. Seaboard System Railroad,
Inc., 87 N.C. App. 512, 361 S.E.2d 909(1987) - Expert witness needs some knowledge. (See Howerton)
- State v. Rogers, 124 N.C. App. 364 (1996)
- Alka-sensor procedure-anything ok. Bad case.
- State v. Shockley, NO. COA09-241
- Insufficient sample does not impede consecutive
tests.
- State v. Shuping, 213 N.C. 421, 323
S.E.2d 350 (1984) - .10 is enough.
- State v. Smith, 262 N.C. 472, 137 S.E.2d
819 (1964) - In RDO, warrant must allege the cops duty and what defendant did to resist.
- State v. Mulder, COA13-672 Aggravating factors used can't also be convictions.
- State v. Verdicanno, 137 N.C.App. 589
(2000) - Blood test 3 hours later not at a
relevant time.
- State v. Washington, 668 S.E.2d 622
(2008) - When do police have PC to stop and ask
for ID?
- Whitaker Partnership v. Biosignia, Inc.,
358 N.C. 1, 15 (2004) - Collateral estoppel
between DMV and DA on Refusal
- State v. White - Def of consecutive tests.
- State v. Williams, NO COA09-493
- Only use
for PBT=presence of alcohol.
- State v. Wimbish, 555 S.E.2d 329 (2001)
- Apprendi adopted.
- Woolard v. Robertson, DMV Commissioner,
NO. COA12-384 Unpublished.
Affirms Broyer v. Killens.
- Dean
Loven opines on chain of custody v.
confrontation
None of the
SCOTUS
confrontation clause
cases address chain of custody. The truth of
the content of the laboratory report depends
on the results with respect to what was
actually tested, not how the item that was
tested got to the laboratory. If a mistake
was made with respect to what was actually
tested due to problems with handling the
evidence before it got to the laboratory,
that is not a matter within the knowledge of
the laboratory analyst.
Of course it would be unreasonable for an
expert opinion to be based upon a sample
whether the chain of custody is so weak that
a reasonable expert would not rely it for
the purpose of saying what sample is
actually being tested. However, the
laboratory expert will have no idea how the
sample was handled before someone in the lab
signed it out for analysis.
For this reason, I believe the chain of
custody statutes are separate from the
confrontation clause issue. They are a
legislatively created definition of the
prima facie evidence sufficient to establish
the chain of custody with respect to a
motion to exclude or to dismiss. Because
chain of custody goes to the weight and not
the admissibility of the evidence before it
is actually tested by the analyst, and
because the chain of custody is not an
element of a crime, the legislature can
define the prima facie evidence to show
chain of custody.
The statute merely states that if the
requirements are followed the evidence is
admissible. It says nothing about the weight
to be given the evidence, which would be
improper in a criminal proceeding. It says
that because certain
unobjected
to and
therefore
uncontradicted
evidence is
presented concerning the chain of custody,
the fact finder may (but is not required) to
presume the sample analyzed by the analyst
is the sample collected by the police.
If an objection is filed, the statute
requires presentation of sufficient evidence
from which a fact finder could find the
chain of custody is established. The rules
of evidence with respect to authentication
and hearsay will often allow the person in
control of the evidence room to establish
procedure the movement of the evidence to
and from the property room, while that
person's familiarity with the signatures of
the persons signing the evidence out will
probably establish that an analyst indeed
signed the evidence out for analysis. The
officer who obtained the sample will
generally testify he saw the sample drawn
and that he transported it to the property
room. In the typical case, that is going to
be sufficient. In more complicated cases the
chain of custody was, and continues to be
fair game.
Dean
Loven
Assistant Public Defenderas clarke dummitt
says:
As Clark Dummitt says:
I learned a great deal from Dean's post (as
usual); and I am always very hesitant to
ever disagree with Dean (it probably shows
my ignorance on this occasion). While I
agree with Dean that the Supreme Court has
specifically dodged the confrontation issue
on chain of custody so far, I do believe it
is still the correct constitutional
argument, (although probably the third
argument, after relevance and a statutory
challenge) and not necessary the best way of
fighting Chain of Custody.
Regardless of 6th amendment issues, never
let the State get away with the statement
that "chain of custody goes to the weight
and not the admissibility of the evidence."
That is a flat out misrepresentation by the
prosecutor's handbook of the three cases
which it sites. Read St. v. Grier, 300
S.E.2d 351 (1983), St. v. Bailey, 334 S.E.2d
266 (1985), and St. v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470
(1995). In each of those cases which
prosecutors misquote there was a weak link,
and not a missing link. A weak link goes to
weight, but a missing link goes to
admissibility. If the State does not have a
Chain of Custody witness there is ipso facto
a missing link, not a weak link.
Clearly you need to have a copy of State v.
Ortiz-Zape, ___ N.C. ___, (2013), and State
v. Brewington, ___ N.C. ___, (2013), and be
familiar with these but they deal more with
confrontation limited to a reviewing expert
and not the testing expert, the Chain of
Custody issue is more basic.
As the Court held in Melendez-Diaz, "The
Sixth Amendment does not permit the
prosecution to prove its case via ex parte
out-of-court affidavits." As such, the State
is required to produce the chemical analyst
to appear at trial but, as Dean so ably
points out, the Court did not address how
chain of custody is to be proven. However
the legislature, in response to the Melendez-Diaz
decision, amended N.C.G.S. 20-139.1 by
adding (c3) which directly addresses how the
State must prove chain of custody. I argue
to the court that the Supremes had a clear
chance to spout some dicta to close this
door, but deliberately choose not to,
because it is not a closed issue. If the
Supremes thought it was even a close call,
they would have leaned towards giving the
State the benefit of the doubt to "further
the important interests of the State" or
some such nonsense.
But even prior to getting to the
constitution or the statute, first reeducate
the judge about relevance. The Court spelled
out in State v. Campbell that the item
offered must be identified as being the same
object involved in the incident and it must
be shown that the object has undergone no
material change. "A detailed chain of
custody need be established only when the
evidence offered is not readily identifiable
or is susceptible to alteration and there is
reason to believe that it may have been
altered." Both are the case with Blood.
Blood evidence is not evidence that is
readily identifiable; one person's red blood
looks identical to another person's red
blood. To the ordinary observer, without the
benefit of sophisticated scientific
equipment and specialized training, all
blood appears essentially the same and one
such sample is indistinguishable from
another. Because blood is not readily
identifiable, the State must establish a
detailed chain of custody regarding the
blood sample to be offered into evidence
before it can be relevant to the case.
On the second prong the State will typically
argue that "there is [no] reason to believe
that it may have been altered," however any
judge should know, and any basic biology
text book will confirm, blood is a
biological material that breaks down over
time. A blood sample is susceptible to
alteration even if properly stored, but
especially if not properly handled in the
chain, as the sample can degrade skewing any
potential test results (this of course is
more complex to get the science in front of
a Judge, but it is hard for a prosecutor to
say with a straight face that blood is not
biologic and doesn't break down, and if they
do, call them on it). If the State cannot
properly establish an unbroken chain of
custody then, by its very biologic nature,
reason exists to believe that the blood
sample, as originally drawn, exists now in
an altered state. Blood changes over time,
and scientifically the State must show that
the blood as tested is relevant to the blood
as drawn, to make it relevant to the guilt
or innocence.
On the statutory issue: Post Melendez-Diaz
the legislature amended the laws so that the
Defense must now give the State notice of
motions to suppress prior to trial,
objecting to the proper foundation is not a
motion to suppress. The Defendant is not
required to file any motion pretrial to
point out to the State the weaknesses in
their case; nor to advise the prosecutor on
how to call witnesses nor how to litigate
their case to get proposed evidence properly
admitted at trial.
To be admissible into evidence, the State
must lay a foundation for the evidence and
introduce testimony sufficient to support a
finding that the thing sought to be admitted
is in fact what its proponent claims.
N.C.G.S. §8C-1, Rule 901(a). This
requirement of authentication or
identification is a condition precedent to
the admissibility of evidence.
According to N.C.G.S. 20-139.1 (c3), the
State may only use properly signed documents
to prove chain of custody if the State
notified the Defendant at least 15 business
days prior to the proceeding of its intent
to use the document and the Defendant does
not file notice of objection at least 5 days
prior to trial. The Statute, in pertinent
part, reads:
(c3) Procedure for Establishing Chain of
Custody Without Calling Unnecessary
Witnesses.
(1) For the purpose of establishing the
chain of physical custody or control of
blood or urine tested or analyzed to
determine whether it contains alcohol, a
controlled substance or its metabolite, or
any impairing substance, a statement signed
by each successive person in the chain of
custody that the person delivered it to the
other person indicated on or about the date
stated is prima facie evidence that the
person had custody and made the delivery as
stated, without the necessity of a personal
appearance in court by the person signing
the statement.
(2) The statement shall contain a sufficient
description of the material or its container
so as to distinguish it as the particular
item in question and shall state that the
material was delivered in essentially the
same condition as received. The statement
may be placed on the same document as the
report provided for in subsection (c1) of
this section.
(3) The provisions of this subsection may be
utilized in any administrative hearing, but
can only be utilized in cases tried in the
district and superior court divisions, or in
an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court,
if:
a. The State notifies the defendant at least
15 business days before the proceeding at
which the statement would be used of its
intention to introduce the statement into
evidence under this subsection and provides
a copy of the statement to the defendant,
and
b. The defendant fails to file a written
notification with the court, with a copy to
the State, at least five business days
before the proceeding at which the statement
would be used that the defendant objects to
the introduction of the statement into
evidence.
If the defendant's attorney of record, or
the defendant if that person has no
attorney, fails to file a written objection
as provided in this subsection, then the
statement shall be admitted into evidence
without the necessity of a personal
appearance by the person signing the
statement. Upon filing a timely objection,
the admissibility of the report shall be
determined and governed by the appropriate
rules of evidence.
(4) Nothing in this subsection precludes the
right of any party to call any witness or to
introduce any evidence supporting or
contradicting the evidence contained in the
statement.
So long as the Defendant has properly lodged
an objection to the introduction of the
statements into evidence the State must be
able to provide live testimony from each
successive person in the chain of custody
regarding the blood sample to be introduced
as the State cannot provide affidavit's in
lieu of sworn testimony over the objection
of the Defendant by statute (still undecided
by the Supremes as Dean points out).
Failure to establish the proper foundation
for evidence by an unbroken chain of custody
renders the evidence inadmissible. In State
v. Mason, the appellate Court found the
trial testimony, regarding a video tape
offered by the State, was insufficient to
establish either a proper foundation for
accepting the tape into evidence or to
establish an unbroken chain of custody. 550
S.E.2d, 15-16 10 (2001). The Court based its
findings on the basis that no testimony was
presented from any witness who handled the
tape. Id. If the State fails to establish a
proper foundation for unbroken chain of
custody by failure to provide live
testimony, the blood evidence is
inadmissible.
State's Typical Argument:
The State will traditionally argue that a
missing Chain of Custody goes to the weight
of the evidence and not to its
admissibility. The State typically,
inappropriately, sites State v. Grier, 300
S.E.2d 351 (1983), State v. Bailey, 334
S.E.2d 266 (1985); and State v. Frye, 341
N.C. 470 (1995). None of these cases hold
that a missing link in the chain of custody
goes to weight rather than admissibility.
In State v. Grier, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983) the
defense argued that even though the Doctor
was present when the blood was drawn, and
testified at trial, her testimony was not
enough to establish Chain of Custody because
the actual person who drew the blood did not
testify. The Court ruled that: "Dr. Rita Kay
Williams examined the victim shortly after
the rape on 22 September 1981. She testified
that although she did not actually see the
blood drawn from Mrs. Lee, she signed a
blood sample that was supposedly taken from
the victim by a laboratory technician either
immediately before or after the examination.
The technician who drew the blood did not
testify."
Thus the Court correctly ruled that while
there was a weakness in the Chain, there was
not a missing link, the State had adequately
shown the link, and the weakness went to
weight not admissibility it since she was
the supervising doctor, and was present, and
testified, to establish the chain of
custody.
In State v. Bailey, 334 S.E.2d 266 (1985)
the defense argued that the State had not
proven that ALL possible flaws in the
procedures had been eliminated. It was a
specious argument that had nothing to do
with Chain of Custody: "As to the
reliability of the specimen for testing,
defendant argues that the State failed to
produce evidence that the specimen was not
contaminated by testing or by procedures in
obtaining the specimen, such as the use of
an alcohol swab on defendant's arm or
sterilization of the sampling apparatus in
alcohol. There was no evidence elicited on
direct or cross-examination of the
technologist [note: the person testified,
but was not asked questions about the
procedures] as to the procedures employed in
drawing the specimen, or whether any tests
were, in fact, performed on it at the Onslow
Memorial Hospital laboratory. The State is
not required to negate every possible flaw
in the testing procedure in order for the
results of the chemical analysis to be
admissible, it is only required that the
State show compliance with the provisions of
G.S. 20-139.1. In this case, through its
evidence and the defendant's stipulation,
the State met its burden of proving
compliance with the statute so as to render
the evidence admissible. Defendant's
argument that the State has failed to show
the nonexistence of flaws in the procedures
more properly relates to the weight to be
given the evidence by the jury, rather than
its admissibility."
In State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470 (1995):"
Defendant objected to the portion of
Elwell's testimony that relied on Exhibit 22
and to the exhibit's admission into evidence
on the sole ground that "there was no
testimony from anyone as to who drew that
blood or when it was drawn or, in fact, that
it was drawn from Mr. Ralph Childress."
As to the ground for objection properly
preserved, this Court has stated that the
person who draws a blood sample need not
always testify to establish a proper
foundation for the admission of the sample.
State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 632-33, 300
S.E.2d 351, 353-54 (1983). In Grier, the
first link of the chain of custody was
sufficiently proven because a doctor who had
examined a rape victim "testified that
although she did not actually see the blood
drawn from [the victim], she signed a blood
sample that was supposedly taken from the
victim by a laboratory technician either
immediately before or after the examination.
The technician who drew the blood did not
testify." Id. at 632, 300 S.E.2d at 353. We
concluded that "[a]ny weakness in the chain
of custody relate[d] only to the weight"
All three of the cases which the State
typically argues are NOT cases where there
are missing links, but merely weak links.
These cases in fact affirm the rule of law
that the State must prove chain of custody,
and if they do not then lay the proper
foundation then the evidence is not
admissible. In fact State v. Bailey, 334
S.E.2d 266 (1985) affirms the argument that
the State must comply with "the provisions
of G.S. 20-139.1..." in proving chain of
custody, and the new provisions require each
person in the chain to sign the statement
that the blood was receive and passed on
without being altered or contaminated, but
only allows these signed statements if the
Defendant does not file an objection in
writing. As long as you properly objected,
then the State must call the witnesses and
prove the Chain and allow 6th amendment
confrontation.
So yes, I think the 6th amendment is still
alive and well in "missing links" in Chain
of Custody, but more than that, the
legislature gave us a great framework in
N.C.G.S. 20-139.1 (c3), and basic
"relevance" is still a fundamental hurtle
for the State before they can even get to
the statutory, and then the constitutional
issues.
While I am a practical litigator, and I
recognize that in District Court so many
judges will not listen, I think it is our
obligation to bludgeon judges and DAs with
the law in very case regardless of the
futility. Slowly, after hearing it enough,
you will start to make progress, or at least
you will punish the Judges who will not
follow the law by making them miss their
golf game. Educate your Judges, don't leave
it to the Institute of Government and the
prosecutors.
Clarke Dummit
-
shea denning's take on stoned
driving
-
nhtsa says stoned can't be
proven with blood
-
Combs v.
Robertson, Commissioner of the NC DMV NO. COA14-709 (2015)
- The 4th Amendment does not apply in DMV Hearings.
-
State
v. Snead, 2015 WL 659745 (2015) - Authenticating and Introducing Video
Probable Cause Cases
- Alford v. Devenpeck, 125 S.ct 588 (2004) -
Probably Cause - Amnesty officer’s state of mind not
important.
- State v. Ange, 151 N.C.App. 297 (2002)
- Seizure defined.
- Atkins v. Moye, (1970) - Need more than odor
or drinking.
- State v. Bartlett, No. COA97-999 (1998)
- Alka sensor not admissible. If not sure
controlled substance, cont seize.
- Bostick v. FL, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)
- Probably Cause when
is encounter a seizure.
- State v. Branch, 591 S.E.2d (2004) Falana
upheld - Reasonable Suspicion more after checkpoint.
- State v. Bruder, 488 U.S. (1988)
- Ordinary
traffic stop not a seizure that requires
Miranda.
- State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332 (2001)
- Objective? Formal arrest or restraint?
- State v. Carrouthers, NO.COA09-31
- Handcuffs not equal to arrest. Bad case.
- State v. Cothran, 463 S.E.2d (1995) - Per
se .08 case
- Dunaway v. NY, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)
- Seizure? Yes here.
- State v. Falana, 501 S,E,2d 358 (1998)
- Once original of stop done, need Reasonable
Suspicion. "Nervous" is not enough.
- State v. Fisher, No. COA99-1222 - After
Officer’s stop need Reasonable Suspicion for further detention.
- State v. Helms, 504 S.E.2d 293 (1998) - HGN
not admissible.
- Holman v. OH, 99-1107 (2000) - FST’s
require STRICT compliance
- State v. Icard, NO. 236A08 (2009) - Good
case for need Probably Cause to detain and?
- State v. Jeffries, 17 N.C.App. 195 (1972)
- Probably Cause: officer must have reasonable grounds to
believe offense has occurred here: NG DWI!
- State v. Myles, 654 S.E.2d 752 (2008)
- Affirms Falana. Nervous not enough to continue
holding defendant.
- Pringle v. MD, 124 S.Ct. 795 (2005) -
Probably Cause
need particularized suspicion.
- State v. Rich, 527 S.E.2d 299 (2000) - PBT
not equal to Probably Cause - DA uses this case.
- State v. Rogers, 124 N.C.App. 364 (1996)
- State’s PBT case
- Royer v. Florida, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) - RS
and Probably Cause to arrest
- State v. Sellars, No. COA11-1315 (2012)
- Fisher/Falana de minimis delay= all ok.
Bad
- Stansbury v. CA, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (1994)
- Custody is objective question.
- Whren v. US, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) - Probably
Cause is
objective question.
- State v. Williams, No.COA09-493 (2010) - PBT positive= presence of alcohol.
- State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251 (1984) -
Probably Cause standard reasonable caution.
-
State
v. Sewell , NO.COA14-269 (2015) 6&6 HGN and Positive PVT is not PC.
REASONABLE SUSPICION - ALPHABETIZED BY 1ST DEFENDANT’S LAST NAME:
- State v Adkins &
Eanes, 90 N.C.App. 333 (1988) Weaving and run off road
1 time =
Reasonable Suspicion.
-
U.S. v Arvizu,
122 S.Ct. 744 (2002) - Bad case -
Legal behavior can lead to Reasonable
Suspicion.
-
State v Aubin,
100 N.C.App. 628 (1990) - Bad case - Slow driving and weaving=Reasonable
Suspicion (pre-Wrenn)
-
State v Barnard,
62 N.C. 244, 65 (2008) - Bad case - 30 second
delay at green light = Reasonable Suspicion. (But see State v. Roberson)
-
State v Battle,
109 N.C.App. 367 (1993) - Reasonable
Suspicion
defined.
-
State v Bonds,
139 N.C.App. 627 (2000) - Bad case -
Reasonable Suspicion = equals combo of all factors (here,
window down in cold weather).
-
State v Braxton,
90 N.C.App. 204 (1988) - Furtive
movement does not lead to Reasonable
Suspicion. No authority
to arrest for infraction.
-
Brendlin v CA
551 U.S. 249, 127
S.Ct. 2400 (2007)-R.S. Passenger can
challenge stop.
-
U.S. v Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1975) - Reasonable
Suspicion defined:
Mexican not enough.
-
State v Burke, __
N.C.App. ___, 712 S.E.2d 704 (2011) - Affirmed by NC Supreme Court on January 27,
2012. Low number on 30-day tag does NOT =
Reasonable Suspicion. Can’t
guess on Reasonable Suspicion. The officer stopped the vehicle
because the numbers on the 30-day
tag looked low and that the "low" number led
him to "wonder[sic] about the possibility of
the tag being fictitious." The
court noted that it has previously held that
30-day tags that were unreadable, concealed,
obstructed, or illegible, justified stops of
the vehicles involved. Here, although the
officer testified that the 30-day tag was
dirty and worn, he was able to read the tag
without difficulty; the tag was not faded;
the information was clearly visible; and the
information was accurate and proper.
-
Illinois v Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)
-
Fisher/Falana; dissent good. How long can
you be held after a stop?
-
State v Campbell,
188 N.C.App. 701 (2008) Mere
proximity to crime not enough But here there
was more and thus enough for Reasonable
Suspicion.
-
State v Chlopek,
704 S.E.2d. 563 (2011) - Suspicious
not enough.
-
Webb v Clark, 264
N.C. 474 (1965) - Spinning tires
not equal to careless and reckless.
-
State v Clyburn,
120 N.C.App. 377 (1995) - Search of
auto for carrying concealed weapon,
Reasonable Suspicion
rules. (pre-Gant).
-
State
v Coleman, 743 S.E.2d 62 (2013) Open
container in PVA not R.S.
-
State v Cooper, 186 N.C.App. 100 (2007) - Report that black male committed armed robbery without more did not provide police officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify stop and frisk.
- State v Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456
-
Simple violation of a traffic regulation which does not involve actual danger to life, limb or property would not perforce constitute the criminal offense reckless driving.
-
State v
Covington, 138 N.C.App. 688 (2000)
- Reasonable Suspicion defined.
- State v Davis, 165 N.C. App. 545 (2004)
Unpublished - Weaving within
1 lane for more than .5 mile, then crossing
the center line, + 10 miles below speed
limit enough for Reasonable Suspicion.
-
State v Derbyshire, 745 S.E.2d 886
(2013) One weave + bright lights not equal
to R.S.
-
FL v Diaz, 800
So.2d 326 (2001) - Stop based on
mistake not ok.
-
US v Doyle, 650
F.3d 460 (2011) - Evidence excluded
based on search warrant defective as to time
(staleness)
-
State v Falana,
129 N.C.App. 813 (1998) - Once
original purpose of stop is done, need additional
Reasonable Suspicion to continue.
-
State v Fields,
673 S.E.2d 765 (2009) - Weaving is
not enough for Reasonable Suspicion.
-
State v Fisher,
141 N.C.App. 44 (2000) - After
traffic stop, need Reasonable Suspicion for further
detention.
-
State v Fleming,
106 N.C.App. 165 (1992) Follows
Brown v. Texas. Not a car case.
-
State v Foster, NO. 09-5161 (2010) - NO
Reasonable Suspicion.
-
US
v Fountain Foster, 2011
WL 857785 (2011) - NO Reasonable Suspicion. Panel deeply troubled by Government’s attempts to spin defendant’s “largely mundane acts into a web of deceptions".
-
State v Griffin 589 F.3d 148 (2009)-RS
to stop.
-
State
v Haislip 651 S.E.2d 243 (2007)-When is a checkpoint stop a checkpoint stop? Also-what is a stop?
-
State v Hayes, 88
N.C.App. 313 (2008) - Follows Fleming, this is a car case.
-
State v Heien,
714 S.E.2d 827 (2011) - One brake light is enough. Write of supersedes and review allowed to NC Supreme Court, 1/26/12.
-
State v
Hernandez, 170 N.C.App. 299 (2005) -
Held after stop is ok, but must be short (under 10 minutes). Also, here there was consent to search.
-
State v Hess, 185
N.C.App. 530 (2007) - Driver revoked = Reasonable Suspicion.
-
State v Hiatt,
184 N.C.App. 190 (2007) - Blue lights= stop. Unpublished
-
State v Hodges,
672 S.E.2d 724 (2009) - Interprets
Falana. Held yes to Reasonable Suspicion here.
-
State v Hopper,
NO. COA09-1211 - Reasonable Suspicion mistake of
fact ok mistake of law not ok.
Unpublished
-
State v Huey, 694
S.E.2d 410 (2010) - Officer must be
sure client resembles criminal.
-
State v Ivey, 360
N.C. 562 (2006) - No turn signal is
not Reasonable Suspicion to stop. (But see St. v. Styles)
-
State v Jacobs,
162 N.C.App. 251 (2004) - Reasonable
Suspicion where
officer observed defendant's car weaving
within its lane of travel for three-quarters
of a mile at 1:43 a.m. in an area near bars.
-
State v Johnson,
204 N.C.App. 259, 264, 693 S.E.2d 711,
714-715 (2010) “Defendant
contends that the trial court committed
error by upholding the warrantless stop of
his car based solely on the information
provided to the police by an anonymous
tipster. We conclude that, while the tip at
issue included identifying details of a
person and car allegedly engaged in illegal
activity, it offered few details of the
alleged crime, no information regarding the
informant's basis of knowledge, and scant
information to predict the future behavior
of the alleged perpetrator. Thus, given the
limited details contained in the tip, and
the failure of the officers to corroborate
the tip's allegations of illegal activity,
the tip lacked sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify the warrantless stop
in this case.
-
State v Jones, 96
N.C.App. 389 (1989) Weaving and
slow driving = Reasonable Suspicion.
-
State v Jones,
No. 11-4268 - Blocking car=need
Reasonable Suspicion
(=STOP!)
-
State v Knudsen NO.COA12-1475-Open
container in PVA not RS.
-
State v Kochuk 741 S.E.2d 327
(2012)-Fail to maintain lane control not RS.
-
Rowe v Maryland,
363 Md. 424, 769 A.2d 879 (2001)
Driver's momentary crossing of edge line of
roadway and later touching of that line did
not amount to unsafe lane change or unsafe
entry onto the roadway, conduct prohibited
by statute, and did not support traffic
stop. Driver's momentary crossing of edge
line of roadway and later touching of that
line did not rise to level necessary to
justify traffic stop on the ground that it
was community caretaking stop for purposes
of providing assistance.
-
State v Malunda 749 S.E.2d 280 (2013)-PC
to search vehicle not equal to PC to search
passenger.
-
US v Mayo, 361
F.3d 802 (2004) - An encounter
occurring in a high-crime area that was
targeted for special enforcement by police
does not support reasonable suspicion unless
coupled with other suspicious activity.
-
State v
McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 517 (1999)
- Reasonable Suspicion = nervous and problems with car
ownership.
-
State v McLamb,
186 N.C.App. 124 (2007) Cop’s
mistake as to speed limit gives no Probable
Cause to
stop.
-
State v McRae,
NO.COA09-114 - No turn signal can
be Reasonable Suspicion. Reliable informant tip can supply
Probable Cause or Reasonable Suspicion.
-
Kansas v Morris,
276 Kan. 11 (2003) - Blue lights
and stop are equal to a seizure, and so need
Reasonable Suspicion.
-
State v Murray,
192 N.C.App. 684 (2008) - Police
officer lacked Reasonable Suspicion when he
stopped a vehicle to find out why it was
traveling in an area with a history of
break-ins.
-
State v Myles,
654 S.E.2d 752 (2008) Passenger’s
nervousness not enough for Reasonable
Suspicion - Falana
-
State v Otto, 726
S.E.2d 752 (2012) - Weaving + Reasonable
Suspicion
= Bad case.
-
State v Phifer 741 S.E.2d 446
(2013)-Nervous behaviour alone does not
equal RS.
-
State v Rhyne,
124 N.C.App. 84 (1996) - Pat down
not ok.
-
State v Roberson,
240 N.C. 745 (1954) - Skidding +
wreck equals C&R.
-
State v Roberson,
592 S.E.2d 733 (2004) - 6 second
delay at green light is not Reasonable
Suspicion.
-
State v Schiffer,
132 N.C.App. 22 (1999) - Windshield
tinting enough for Reasonable Suspicion. Car search o.k. (Pre-Gant).
-
State v Sellars,
NO.COA11-1315 (2012) - Falana. Not
good-look at how long stop extended.
-
State v Smathers 753 S.E.2d 380
(2014)-No PC for traffic stop needed, with
community caretaking doctrine adopted for
first time by NC Court of Appeals.
A. In this case any alleged community care
taking exception is a pretext for
impermissible
criminal investigation.
B. In this case, a search or seizure within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has
occurred
and under the totality of the
circumstances an objectively reasonable
basis for a community
care taking
function is not shown. But if shown, the
public need or interest does not outweigh
the intrusion upon the privacy of the
individual.
C. In considering the
applicability of the community care taking
exception, courts must consider the degree
of the public interest and the exigency of
the situation; (2) the attendant
circumstances surrounding the seizure,
including time, location, the degree of
overt authority and force displayed; (3)
whether an automobile is involved; and (4)
the availability, feasibility, and
effectiveness of alternatives to the type of
intrusion actually accomplished, where
danger to life and limb may not be imminent,
but could be prevented by swift action.
-
State v Styles,
362 N.C. 412 (2008) - No turn
signal when changing lanes can be enough to
stop.
-
Terry v Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct.
(1968)-Probable cause defined.
-
State of Texas v
Tarvin, 972 S.W.2d 910 (1998)
-
Weaving not enough, driving =Controlled
weaving.
-
State v Thompson
& Hardee, 296 N.C.703 (1979) -
Reasonable Suspicion
defined, bad case.
-
State v Verkerk 747 S.E.2d 658
(2013)-Stop by fireman ok here.
-
State v Warren NO. COA02-1693- No blue
lights = no stop. Unpublished
-
State v Watson,
122 N.C.App. 596 (1996) - Reasonable
Suspicion
defined.
-
State v Weaver 752 S.E.2d 240
(2013)-Private security guard does not need
RS.
-
US v Whren and
Brown, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) - Any
objective reason is enough for Reasonable
Suspicion.
-
U.S. v Wilson,
205 F.3d 720 (2000) - Can’t see the
tag not enough for Reasonable Suspicion.
-
State v Young,
148 N.C.App. 462 (2002) - Reasonable
Suspicion is an
objective inquiry; anonymous tip enough
here.
Reasonable Suspicion - Miscellaneous
-
SFST Analysis
Form
- Traffic Stops-Article from IOG
- Analysis of legality of running tags without Reasonable Suspicion.
- “Passing and being passed “ from Motor Vehicle Law of North Carolina (not illegal to pass on a double yellow
line).
- List of speed and weaving cases.
Roadblock Cases
-
State v Barnes,
123 N.C.App. 144 (1996) - No
discretion allowed at checkpoint.
-
State v Bowden,
177 N.C.App. 718 (2006) - A turn
away from a checkpoint roadblock can lead to
RS.
-
State v
Burroughs, 185 N.C.App. 496 (2007) - Upholds
Rose and Edmond.
-
State v Colbert,
146 N.C.App. 506 (2001) - Roadblock
plan ok.
-
State v Collins,
NO. COA11-529 - Turn away from
checkpoint/not a checkpoint stop. Need RS.
-
State v
Corpening, 683 S.E.2d 457 (2009) - Not
a checkpoint stop.
-
Indianapolis v
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) -
Roadblock to serve general interest in crime
control violates 4th amendment.
-
State v Foreman,
351 N.C. 627 (2000) - Okay to stop
for u-turn at roadblock if RS. (Here there
was R.S.; no roadblock analysis necessary).
-
State v Gabriel,
192 N.C.App/ 517 (2008) -
Checkpoint rules.
-
State v Griffin
734 S.E.2d 861 (2013) - Three point
turn begins ->RS
-
State v Grooms,
126 N.C.App. 88 (1997) - Every
driver must be treated the same.
-
State v Haislip,
NO.COA06-1488 (2007) - Client cannot
be arrested if pre-arrest test is requested.
-
State v Jarrett,
NO.COA09-1036 (2010) - Roadblock.
Bad Ruling.
-
State v Kincer,
NO.COA09-1639 - Checkpoint-good on
explaining the rules.
-
IL v Lidster, 540
U.S. 419 (2004) - Roadblock to get
information on hit and run ok.
-
State v Mitchell,
358 N.C. 63 (2004) - Defendant’s
not stopping for checkpoint or his “headlong
flight” supplied RS. Roadblock ok for NOL.
-
State v Nolan,
NO.COA10-518 - Roadblock case-this
case ok.
-
Delaware v
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) - USSC
says roadblocks are ok sometimes.
-
State v Rose, 170
N.C.App. 284 (2005) - Roadblock
needs primary purpose. Multi-purpose
checkpoint is illegal. Must be carefully
tailored to purpose.
-
State v Sanders,
112 N.C.App. 477 (1993) - No
unconstrained discretion allowed.
-
Michigan v Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990) - Roadblock
rules, citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648
(1979).
-
US v Smith, 396
F.3d 579 (2005) - Defendant’s
evasive behavior regarding roadblock
supports finding of reasonable suspicion for
stop.
-
State v Tarlton,
146 N.C.App. 417 (2001) -
Roadblock-supervisor not necessary, written
not necessary.
-
State v Veazey,
689 S.E.2d 530 (2009) - Bad
checkpoint case. Ruling mostly based on poor
appellate advocacy and trail work.
-
State v Veazey,
191 N.C.App. 181 (2008) - Updates
Rose. Still need primary purpose
and 3 factor ground analysis.
-
STATE v.
McDONALD, NO.COA14-893 (2015)
- Roadblock still need Brown analysis (affirms Veazey.)
Roadblock - Miscellaneous
- Order in Robinson Checkpoint not okay.
Search & Seizure
-
State v Alston,
131 N.C.App. 514 (1998) - Constructive
possession of gun not imputed to passenger.
-
State v Artis,
472 S.E.2d 169 (1996) - Pat down
search not okay. (Pants pocket bulge).
-
US v Bond, 529
U.S. 334 (2000) - Police squeezing
bag in overhead bin in bus not ok. Plain
feel not enough!
-
State v Bostick,
501 U.S. 429 (1991) - Bus search
rules, consent to search.
-
State v Braxton,
90 N.C.App. 204 (1988) - Need Probably
Cause
to search
-
Caldwell v State,
780 A.2d 1037 (2001) - The
officer’s citing a defendant with a parking
violation does not then permit the officer
to frisk and handcuff the defendant and
detain him until another officer arrives.
-
State v Carter,
682 S.E.2d (2009) - Search and
seizure of car incident to arrest for
expired tag is lawful.
-
State v Carty,
170 N.J. 632 (2002) - After traffic
stop need Reasonable Suspicion to search car. (NJ
constitution stricter than US Constitution,
as is NC Constitution).
-
State v Cooke,
306 N.C. 132 (1982) - Explains
exceptions to warrant requirement.
-
State v Fleming,
106 N.C.App. 165 (1992) - Pat down
after arrest requires probable cause.
-
AZ v Gant, 129
S.Ct. 1710 (2009) - No search of
car after charge unless related to charge or
defendant in car when arrested.
-
State v Hedgecoe,
Jr., 106 N.C.App. 157 (1992) -
Paraphernalia must be connected to drugs.
-
Co v Heilman, 52
P.3d 324 (2002) S - earch not
consensual because officer’s asked.
-
WY v Houghton,
526 U.S. 295 (1999) - Refines
consent to search.
-
State v Icard,
363 N.C. 303 (2009) - Probably Cause is needed
to detain defendant.
-
State v Jackson,
681 S.E.2d 492 (2009) - Passenger
has standing to contest unconstitutional
stop.
-
State v Mbacke,
721 S.E.2d 218 (2012) - Bad case re:
Gant search.
-
Jones v U.S., 362
U.S. 257 (1960) - Needs reasonable
corroboration of informant’s statement for
Probably Cause.
-
Knowles v Iowa,
525 U.S. 113 (1998) - Search after
traffic citation, even if consent, not ok.
-
US v Lattimore,
87 F.3d. 647 (1996) - Consent to
search after traffic stop.
-
US v Maple, 348
F.3d 260 (2003) - Search of car’s
closed compartment must be reasonable and
must follow police procedure.
-
State v
McDougald, 665 S.E.2d 99 (2008) - Search
with consent from one resident with another
non-consenting resident present is not ok in
private areas.
-
Mincey v Arizona,
437 U.S. 385 (1978) E - mergency
exception to 4th Amendment
warrant requirement.
-
State v Minor,
132 N.C.App. 478 (1999) S - earch of
car when the defendant gets out of a car is
not okay without more information. (movement
not “furtive.”)
-
State v Nance,
149 N.C.App. 734 (2002) - Must be
legally in area for plain view.
-
State v Pasour,
NO.COA12-190 (2012) - Cops must
legally be there to get plain view.
-
State v Pearson,
348 N.C. 272 (1998) - Consent to
search vehicle does not include a pat down,
pat down “protective” search not okay.
-
State v
Poczontek, 90 N.C.App. 455 (1988) - Probably Cause - Informant, plain view? Good case.
-
Ga v Randolph,
547 U.S. 103 (2006) - Search case-
1 resident says yes, one says no, no
consent, no search.
-
Commonwealth of
VA v Rice, 28 Va. App. 374 (1998) - If cop holds Driver's License, defendant not free to leave
and therefore his consent is invalid.
-
Oh v Robinette,
519 U.S. 33 (1996) - When is
consent to illegal search freely given?
-
US v Antoine
Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) - GPS
track requires warrant.
-
US v Sakyi, 160
F.3d 164 (1998) - Legal to frisk passenger if
Reasonable Suspicion exists.
-
U.S.
v Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)
- Defendant can only claim 4th
amendment violation if defendant’s rights
have been violated.
-
State
v Simmons, NO.COA09-268 (2010)
- Cigar guts not equal to drugs.
-
IL
v Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)
- High
crime area + unprovoked flight = Reasonable
Suspicion to
frisk. (Terry case.)
-
Yarborough
v Alvarado, 124 S.ct.
2140 (2004) - Miranda - Did defendant feel
free to leave?
- State v Williams, 673 S.E.2d 394 (2009)
- Plain feel standard as Probably Cause.
Wreck Cases (including Blood Test Cases)
- Atkins v. Moye, N.C. 106, 161 S.E.2d 568
(1970) - Need more than odor or drinking.
- State v. Cooke, 270 N.C.App. 644 (1967)
- Blood Test case. Drunk at time of driving is all
that’s relevant.
- State v. Cox, ___ N.C.App. ___ , No.
COA11–609–2 (August 07, 2012) - Corpus delicti
needs evidence of opportunity or other
corroborative evidence.
- State v. Cruz, 173 N.C. App. 689, 620
S.E.2d 251 (2005) - Refines Trexler; also-GAF
child must be found by jury.
- State v. Hairr, 244 N.C. 506 (1956)
- Drinking ok- need intoxicated.
- Milton v. Shaffer, 126 N.C. App. 197
(1994) - Blood test chain of custody.
- State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985)
- Sets out rule in non-capital case when state
relies on defendant’s confession to obtain a
conviction. No longer necessary that there be
independent proof tending to establish corpus delecti of the crime charged if the accused’s
confession supported by substantial independent
evidence tending to establish its
trustworthiness including facts tending to show
defendant had the opportunity to commit the
crime.
- State v. Patterson, NO. COA10-538 (2011)
- Reduces impact of Verdicanno.
- State v. Ray, 54 N.C. App. 473 (1981)
- Trexler case.
- Robinson v. Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 669 (1961)
- Blood test before any other substance injected.
- State v. Scott, 146 N.C. App. 283 (2001)
- Need more than slurred speech to prove impaired.
- State v. Smith, 669 S.E.2d 299 (2008)
- Court held there was not sufficient evidence to
get around corpus delecti problem.
- State v. Trexler, 316 N.C. App. 528
(1986) - Corpus delecti rule; a defendant’s
admission to an element of crime is not enough
to prove that element.
Wrecks - Miscellaneous
- Paul Glover Testimony Hospital Blood Test objections